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 TASARISIZ AĞLARDA DAĞITIK ANAHTAR YÖNETİM SİSTEMİ
ÖZET
Tasarısız ağlar hareketli sunucular için yeni bir kablosuz dağıtık haberleşme paradigması
oluşturmuşlardır.  Geleneksel  ağlarda  terminaller  birbirleriyle   kablolar  aracılığıyla
bağlıdırlar, ayrıca ağ üzerinde özelleşmiş sunuculara ihtiyaç duyarlar(Örneğin paketleri
yönlendiren yönlendiriciler).
Tasarısız  ağlarda  ise  terminaller  kablosuz  arabirimler  ile  birbirlerine  bağlıdırlar  ve
önceden  ayarlanmış  özel  bir  altyapıya  ihtiyaç  duymazlar.  Mesela  her  terminal  bir
yönlendirici  sorumluluğunu  yerine  getirerek  paketleri  diğer  terminallerin  yerine
ulaştırırlar.
Tasarısız ağlar savaş alanlarında, askeri personelin merkezi ve kalıcı bir altyapıya ihtiyaç
duymadan  haberleşebilmesi  amacıyla  kullanılmak  üzere  geliştirildiler  ve  basit  mobil
cihazları destekleyecek şekilde tasarlandılar.
Mavi  diş  ve  IEEE 802.11  gibi  kablosuz  teknolojilerinde  görülen  gelişmeler  tasarısız
ağları daha da cazip hale getirdi ve günümüzde bir çok değişik alanda kendine uygulama
alanı bulmuştur. 
Kablosuz ağlar güvenlik saldırılarına, paket  taşıma işleminin hava ortamında yapılması
sebebiyle, geleneksel ağlardan daha fazla açıktır. 
Özellikle  haberleşmeyi  dinleme,  ikinci  kere  tekrarlama  ve  araya  girip  değiştirme
saldırılarına  karşı  tam  bir  hedef  durumundadırlar.  Dolayısıyla  kablosuz  ağlar  bu  tip
saldırılara karşı koyacak mekanizmaları içinde barındıracak şekilde yapılandırılmalıdırlar.
Tasarısız ağlar için tasarlanan pek çok uygulama sağlam güvenlik yapıtaşlarına ve gizlilik
koruma metotlarına  ihtiyaç duymaktadırlar.  Sabit  yapıları  ve kablolu terminalleri  olan
ağlar bu ihtiyaçları karşılayabilmek için merkezi güvenlik çözümleri kullandılar.(Örneğin
güvenilir üçüncü partiler, ateş duvarları)
Ancak tasarısız ağların sabit bir yapıları olmadığı ve kaotik karakteristiklerinden dolayı
bu tür mekanizmaların etkinliği önemli ölçüde kısıtlanmış oldu.
Bir iletişim sisteminin başarısı iletilen bilginin güvenliğinden emin olunmasıyla ölçülür.
İletişim kuran her hangi iki birimin efektif olarak haberleşebilmeleri için karşılıklı güven
kurmaları  gerekmektedir.  Doğrulama(  yetkilendirme)  böyle bir  güven kurmanın  temel
yoludur. İletişimin herhangi iki düğüm arasında olabileceği büyük ve dinamik ağlarda her
düğümün  diğer  düğümleri  doğrulayabilmesini  varsaymak  imkansızdır.  Bu  yüzden
doğrulama servisi ayrıca sağlanmalıdır. Bunun geleneksel yöntemlerinden biri de ortak
güvenilir üçüncü tarafların devreye sokulmasıdır. Açık Anahtar Altyapılarındaki sertifika
otoritesi böyle bir yaklaşımın en başarılı örneklerinden biridir. 
Açık anahtar altyapısı iletişim kuran düğümlerin sertifika otoritesi aracılığıyla birbirlerini
doğrulayabildikleri  herhangi  bir  ağda  kullanılabilir.  Ancak  böyle  bir  yapının  tasarısız
kablosuz  ağlarda  kullanılması  doğası  gereği  oldukça  güçtür.  Açık  anahtar  altyapısı
geleneksel  ağlarda başarıyla uygulanmasına  rağmen ,  kablosuz  tasarısız  ağlarda kabul
görüp görmeyeceği belli değildir.
Bu  tezde  tasarısız  ağların  önündeki  engelleri  inceledik,  gerekli  çözümlerin  isterlerini
ortaya koyduk, güvenliğin ne kadar önemli olduğunun altını çizdik ve tasarısız ağlar için
uygulanabilir bir açık anahtar altyapısı çözümü ortaya koyduk. Aynı zamanda tasarısız
ağları  bekleyen güvenlik  saldırılarını  inceledik  ve  karşı  koymak için  gerekli  güvenlik
adımlarını sunduk. Bu tezde önerdiğimiz sertifika otoritesi sağlayan pratik çözüm bir dizi
değişik  ağ  konfigürasyonuna  uygun  ve  tasarısız  ağlarda  kullanılan  yönlendirme
protokollerine kolay ve basit şekilde uyarlanabilir. 
Yüksek  güvenlikli  ve  kullanılabilir  bir  anahtar  yönetim  yapısı  kurabilmek  amacıyla,
sorumluluğu birden fazla sunucuya yayan eşik kriptografisi kullanmayı öneriyoruz. Hatta
tümüyle dağıtık sertifika otoritesi  yöntemini benimsiyoruz, ki bu çözümde ağdaki tüm
düğümler sertifika otoritesinin yeteneklerine sahiptir. Bu çalışma ölçeklenebilir, dağıtık
bir anahtar yönetim servisinin tasarısız ağlar için formüle edilmesini amaçlamaktadır.
Prototip bir dağıtık anahtar yönetim servisi yapılabilirliğini ve performansını göstermek
amacıyla geliştirilmiştir. Bu AAA(Açık Anahtar Altyapısı) servisi ile haberleşmek için
verimli ve efektif bir iletişim sistemidir.
DISTRIBUTED KEY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM IN AD HOC NETWORKS
SUMMARY
Ad hoc networks are a new wireless, decentralized communication paradigm for mobile
hosts.  In traditional networks nodes are interconnected through wired links and there are
specialized nodes, i.e. routers that handle packet forwarding. In Ad hoc networks mobile
nodes are interconnected through wireless interfaces, and nodes do not rely on any fixed
infrastructure.  Instead every node  in  the  network  functions  as  a  router  as  well  as  an
application node and forwards packets on behalf of other nodes.
Ad  hoc  networks  were  initially  developed  explicitly  for  battlefield  settings,  where
military personnel required a communication medium that did not rely on a centralized
entity or wired infrastructure, and had the capability to support lightweight, mobile nodes.
Developments in wireless technologies, such as Bluetooth and IEEE 802.11 made Ad hoc
networks more attractive.  Also civilian applications exploit  the advantages of Ad hoc
networks and although there is a trend to adopt Ad hoc networks for commercial uses due
to their unique properties.
Wireless networks are more prone to security attacks as all transmissions are carried out
using the air medium. They are especially susceptible to attacks of eavesdropping, replay
and spoofing. These systems therefore need to have built-in features to withstand these
attacks without compromising security in any way.  
Many emergent applications designed for Ad hoc networks necessitate robust security
primitives and privacy protection. Networks with fixed topologies and wired hosts have
employed centralized security solutions (e.g., trusted third-parties, firewalls, etc) to fulfill
these requirements. However, the lack of infrastructure and ephemeral nature of Ad hoc
networks  has  limited  the  effectiveness  of  similar  security  mechanisms  in  server-less
contexts.
The success of a communication system is limited by how much trust can be placed in the
information being transmitted. For any two communicating entities, mutual trust must be
established to support effective communication. Authentication is the fundamental basis
for  building  such  trust.  In  large-scale  dynamic  networks,  where  communication  may
occur  between any two  entities,  it  is  not  feasible  to  expect  every entity to  have  the
capability to authenticate all other entities with which it might communicate. To this end,
it is necessary to provide a framework for authentication. One of the traditional ways to
support such authentication is to involve a commonly trusted third party. The Certificate
Authority in  the Public  Key Infrastructure  is  one of  the most  popular  and successful
examples of such an approach. Public Key Infrastructure can be used in any networks
where the communicating parties can authenticate each other via correspondence with the
Certificate  Authority.  However,  providing  such  an  infrastructure  in  Ad  hoc  wireless
networks is a challenging task due to their infrastructure-less nature. Although Public Key
Infrastructure has been successfully deployed in wired and infrastructure-based networks,
it is unclear if this is approach can be successfully extended to wireless Ad hoc networks. 
In this thesis, we studied these challenges in detail, identified the requirements for such
solutions, pointed out the importance of its security and proposed a practical Public Key
Infrastructure service for Ad hoc networks. Also, we have analyzed the security threats an
Ad hoc network faces and presented the security objectives that need to be achieved.
Furthermore we presented a practical solution to provide Certificate Authority support
that is also flexible to the varying network configurations simple to implement and easy
to integrate with Ad hoc network routing protocols.
To build a highly available and highly secure key management service, we propose to use
threshold  cryptography to  distribute  trust  among  all  servers.  We also  adopt  the  fully
distributed certificate authority approach, which means the capabilities of the certificate
authority are distributed to all nodes in the Ad hoc network. Moreover this work aims at
providing a scalable, distributed key management services in Ad hoc networks.
A prototype of the distributed key management service has been implemented,  which
shows its  feasibility and  availability.  Using this  practical  PKI service,  we present  an
effective  and  efficient  communication  protocol  for  correspondence  with  certification
services.
1. INTRODUCTION
A wireless Ad hoc network is a collection of wireless mobile hosts forming a temporary
network without the aid of any established infrastructure or centralized computer such as
base stations or mobile switching centers. Ad hoc networks rely on each other to keep the
network  connected  rather  than  relying  on  any fixed  infrastructure,  unlike  traditional
mobile wireless networks. Battlefields, military tactical operations where geographical or
terrestrial  constraints  demand  a  totally  distributed  network  without  any  fixed
infrastructures, are the main applications of Ad hoc networks. However, applications of
Ad  hoc  networks  range  from  emergency  and  disaster  situations  to  commercial
applications such as sensor networks and virtual classrooms. Ad hoc networks are an
emerging research area with practical applications. Obviously, security is an important
issue  in  such  applications.  However,  they  are  vulnerable  due  to  its  fundamental
characteristics [1].
The main challenge in the design of mobile Ad hoc networks is their vulnerability to
security attacks. Like many distributed systems, security in Ad hoc networks widely relies
on the use of key management mechanisms. Specific key management systems have to be
developed to suit the characteristics of mobile Ad hoc networks because traditional key
management systems are not appropriate for them.
1.1 Background
Ad hoc networking is a wireless networking paradigm for self-organizing networks that
until  recently has mainly been associated with military battlefield networks. However,
with the availability of wireless technologies such as Bluetooth and IEEE 802.11 and the
development  of  the  next  generation  networks,  civilian  applications  that  exploit  the
advantages of Ad hoc networking are being envisioned. So far most of the research that
has  been  done  on  Ad hoc  networking  has  focused  on  routing.  Other  issues  such  as
security  and  network  addressing  have  received  considerably  less  attention  and  these
issues need to be addressed before any successful applications will appear.
1.2 Purpose
Security is an important subject for Ad hoc networks, especially for the applications that
are security-sensitive. To secure an Ad hoc network, we consider the following attributes:
1. Availability
2. Confidentiality
3. Integrity
4. Authentication
5. Non-repudiation.
We employ cryptographic schemes,  such as digital  signatures,  to protect  both routing
information  and  data  traffic.  Also  we  used  encryption  scheme  for  confidentiality  of
routing information and network traffic [1].
Use of such schemes usually requires a key management service. We adopt a public key
infrastructure because of its superiority in distributing keys and in achieving integrity,
confidentiality and non-repudiation. Because of distributed nature of Ad hoc networks
deploying public key infrastructure is not as easy as wired networks. Efficient secret key
schemes are used to secure further communication after nodes authenticate each other and
establish a shared secret session key [1].
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
In this section we presented the background knowledge on Ad hoc Networks, standards,
network security and cryptography.
2.1 Ad Hoc Networks
Mobile Ad hoc network is a collection of wireless mobile nodes dynamically forming a
temporary network without the use of any existing network infrastructure or centralized
administration.  Due to  the  limited  transmission  range  of  wireless  network  interfaces,
multiple hops may be needed for one node to exchange data with another across the
network [1].
2.1.1 Ad hoc networks characteristics
There are a number of characteristics in mobile Ad hoc networks. One of them is that
they have  dynamic topologies.  Nodes are free to  move arbitrarily. Thus,  the network
topology is typically multi-hop, so may change randomly and rapidly at unpredictable
times [2].
Another  characteristic  is  bandwidth  constraint.  Wireless  links  will  continue  to  have
significantly lower capacity than their hardwired counterparts.
Also, there is energy-constraint in this type of networks. Some or all of the nodes in a
mobile Ad hoc network may rely on batteries or other exhaustible means for their energy.
Finally, there is limited physical security. Mobile wireless networks are generally more
prone to physical security threats than are fixed-cable nets. The increased possibility of
eavesdropping, spoofing, and denial-of-service attacks should be carefully considered [2].
2.1.2 Ad hoc networks applications
Examples of potential practical use of mobile Ad hoc networks may be a group of people
with laptop computers at a conference that may wish to exchange files and data without
mediation  of  any  additional  infrastructure  in-between.  It  may  be  used  in home
environment for communication between smart household appliances. Ad hoc networks
are suitable to be used in areas where earthquake or other natural disasters have destroyed
communication  infrastructures.  It  perfectly  satisfies  military  needs  like  battlefield
survivability, operation without pre-placed infrastructure and connectivity beyond the line
of sight.  For monitoring and measuring purposes a large number of small  computing
devices could be spread over a hostile to form self-sustained Ad hoc networks.
Mobile Ad hoc networks have significant advantages above traditional communication
networks. For example, use of Ad hoc networks could increase mobility and flexibility, as
Ad hoc networks can be brought up and torn down in very short time. Ad hoc networks
could be more economical in some cases as they eliminate fixed infrastructure costs and
reduce power  consumption  at  mobile  nodes.  They are  more robust  than conventional
wireless networks because of their non-hierarchical distributed control and management
mechanisms.  Also,  radio emission levels  could be kept at  low level  because of short
communication  links  (node-to-node  instead  of  node  to  a  central  base  station),  this
increases spectrum reuse possibility or possibility of using unlicensed bands. Moreover,
communication beyond Line of Sight (LOS) is possible at high frequencies because of
multi-hop support in Ad hoc networks.
Despite  the  mentioned  advantages  and  potential  application  possibilities,  Ad  hoc
networks  are  yet  far  from  being  deployed  on  large-scale  commercial  basis.  Some
fundamental Ad hoc networking problems remain unsolved or need optimized solutions.
Although various routing protocols are suggested and tested for mobile Ad hoc networks,
performance  metrics  like  throughput,  delay  and  protocol  overhead  in  relation  to
successfully transmitted data need better optimization. This optimization would probably
also depend on application type and desire to maximize the throughput or minimize the
delay. One single protocol  will  probably not  be able to work efficiently across entire
range of design parameters and operating conditions.
2.1.3 Standards Used in Ad hoc Networks
In this part we will give some knowledge about wireless technologies and communication
standards.
2.1.3.1 IEEE 802.11
IEEE 802.11 is a digital wireless data transmission standard in the 2.4 GHz Industrial,
Scientific, and Medicine (ISM) band aimed at providing a wireless Local Area Network
(LAN) between portable  computers and a  fixed network infrastructure.  This  standard
defines a physical layer and a MAC layer. The most popular technology is the direct
sequence spread spectrum and can offer a bit rate of up to 11 Mbps in the 2.4 GHz band,
and in the future, up to 54Mbps in the 5GHz band. The basic access method in the IEEE
802.11 MAC protocol is the Distributed Coordination Function which is a Carrier Sense
Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA) MAC protocol.  However, the
802.11 standard cannot do multi-hop networking as it is. The development of a number of
protocols is required. The maximum data rate of IEEE 802.11 is 11Mbps. Its range is 100
meters [3].
2.1.3.2 Bluetooth
Bluetooth is a digital wireless data transmission standard operating in the 2.4 GHz ISM
band aimed at providing a short-range wireless link between laptops, cellular phones and
other devices. This band defines 79 different Radio Frequency (RF) channels that are
spaced  of  1  MHz.  The  main  aim  of  the  Bluetooth  specification  is  to  guarantee  the
interoperability between different applications that may run over different protocol stacks.
However, in order to implement a wireless multi-hop network over Bluetooth, either or
both a packet switch layer and a circuit switch layer need to be defined on top of the
Bluetooth data link layer protocol.
The maximum data rate of Bluetooth is 1Mbps. Its range is 10 meters. Bluetooth has
lower power consumption than IEEE 802.11. Also, Bluetooth support both voice and data
packet types while IEEE 802.11 just support data packet type [3].
2.2 Network Security
When discussing network security, three aspects can be covered; the services required,
the potential attacks and the security mechanisms. The security services aspect includes
the functionality that is required to provide a secure networking environment while the
security  attacks  cover  the  methods  that  could  be  employed  to  break  these  security
services. Finally the security mechanisms are the basic building blocks used to provide
the security services [5].
2.2.1 Security Services
In providing a secure networking environment some or all of the following services may
be required [5]:
 Confidentiality
 Authentication
 Integrity
 Non-repudiation
2.2.1.1 Confidentiality
The confidentiality service ensures  that  certain  information  being transferred is  never
disclosed to unauthorized entities. Not only is the confidentiality of the transmitted data
also the confidentiality of location (trace-ability) and traffic  analysis  important  in  the
ubiquitous computing environment [5].
2.2.1.2 Authentication
The authentication service enables a node to ensure the identity of the peer node it  is
communicating with.  Without  authentication,  an  adversary could  masquerade  a  node,
thus gaining unauthorized access to resource and sensitive information and interfering
with the operation of other nodes [5].
2.2.1.3 Integrity
The integrity service guarantees that a message being transferred is never corrupted.  A
message  could  be  corrupted  because  of  benign  failures,  such  as  radio  propagation
impairment, or because of malicious attacks on the network. Integrity service ensures that
only authorized parties are able to modify transmitted information. Modification includes
writing, changing status, deleting, creating or replaying of transmitted messages [5].
2.2.1.4 Non-repudiation
The non-repudiation service ensures that parties can prove the transmission or reception
of information by another party, i.e. a party cannot falsely deny having received or sent
certain data [5].
2.3 Security Attacks
Security attacks can be classified in the following two categories [6] depending on the
nature of the attacker:
 Passive Attacks
 Active Attacks
2.3.1 Passive Attacks
The attacker  can only eavesdrop or  monitor  the  network traffic.  Typically this  is  the
easiest  form  of  attack  and  can  be  performed  without  difficulty  in  many  networking
environments, e.g. broadcast type networks such as Ethernet and wireless networks [5].
In a passive attack, the attacker does not disrupt the operation of a routing protocol but
only attempts to discover valuable information by listening to the routing traffic. The
major advantage for the attacker in passive attacks is that in a wireless environment the
attack is  usually impossible to detect.  This also makes defending against such attacks
difficult.  Furthermore,  routing  information  can  reveal  relationships  between nodes  or
disclose their Internet Protocol (IP) addresses. If a route to a particular node is requested
more often than to other nodes, the attacker might expect that the node is important for
the functioning of the network, and disabling it could bring the entire network down [5].
Other  interesting information that is disclosed by routing data is the location of nodes.
Even when it might not be possible to pinpoint the exact location of a node, one may be
able to discover information about the network topology [5].
Depending on the attackers action passive attacks can be classified in the two categories.
2.3.1.1 Eavesdropping
This attack is used to gain knowledge of the transmitted data. This is a passive attack,
which  is  easily  performed,  in  many  networking  environments.  However  using  an
encryption scheme to protect the transmitted data can easily prevent this attack [5].
2.3.1.2 Traffic Analysis
The main goal of this attack is not to gain direct knowledge about the transmitted data,
but to extract information from the characteristics of the transmission, e.g. amount of data
transmitted,  identity of the communicating nodes etc.  This information may allow the
attacker to deduce sensitive information, e. g the roles of the communicating nodes, their
position etc. Unlike the eavesdropping attack this one is more difficult to prevent [6].
2.3.2 Active Attacks
The attacker is not only able to listen to the transmission but is also able to actively alter
or obstruct it. 
To perform an active attack the attacker must be able to inject arbitrary packets into the
network. The goal may be to attract packets destined to other nodes to the attacker fo
analysis or just to disable the network. A major difference in comparison with passive
attacks is that an active attack can sometimes be detected. This makes active attacks a less
inviting option for most  attackers.  Yet, it  may still  be a real alternative when a large
amount of money is at stake such as in commercial or military environments [6].
Depending on the attackers action active attacks can be classified in the nine categories. 
2.3.2.1 Impersonation
Here the  attacker  uses  the  identity of  another  node to  gain  unauthorized  access  to  a
resource  or  data.  This  attack  is  often  used  as  a  prerequisite  to  eavesdropping.  By
impersonating a legitimate node, the attacker can try to gain access to the encryption key
used to protect the transmitted data. Once the attacker knows this key, it can successfully
perform the eavesdropping attack [5].
2.3.2.2 Modification
This attack modifies  data during the transmission between the communicating nodes,
implying that the communicating nodes do not share the same view of the transmitted
data [5].
2.3.2.3 Insertion
This  attack  involves  an  unauthorized  party,  who  inserts  new  data  claiming  that  it
originates from a legitimate party. This attack is related to that of impersonation [5].
2.3.2.4 Replay
The attacker retransmits data previously transmitted by a legitimate node [5].
2.3.2.5 Denial of Service
This  active  attack  aims  at  obstructing  or  limiting  access  to  a  certain  resource.  This
resource could be a specific node or service or the whole network [5].
2.3.2.6 Black Hole
In this attack, a malicious node uses the routing protocol to advertise itself as having the
shortest path to the node whose packets it wants to intercept.
In a flooding based protocol such as Ad hoc on Demand Distance Vector (AODV) the
attacker listens to requests for routes. When the attacker receives a request for a route to
the target node, the attacker creates a reply where an extremely short route is advertised.
If the malicious reply reaches the requesting node before the reply from the actual node, a
forged route has been created. Once the malicious device has been able to insert itself
between the communicating nodes,  it  is able to  do anything with the packets  passing
between them. It can choose to drop the packets to perform a denial-of-service attack, or
alternatively use its place on the route as the first step in a man-in-the-middle attack [6].
2.3.2.7 Sleep Deprivation
Usually, this attack is practical only in Ad hoc networks, where battery life is a critical
parameter.  Battery powered devices try to conserve energy by transmitting only when
absolutely necessary. An attacker can attempt to consume batteries by requesting routes,
or by forwarding unnecessary packets to the node using, for example, a black hole attack.
This  attack  is  especially  suitable  against  devices  that  do  offer  some  services  to  the
network or offer services only to those who have some special credentials. Regardless of
the properties of the services, a node must participate in the routing process unless it is
willing to risk becoming unreachable to the network [6].
2.3.2.8 Location Disclosure
A location disclosure attack can reveal something about the locations of nodes or the
structure of the network.  The information gained might reveal  which other nodes are
adjacent to the target, or the physical location of a node. The attack can be as simple as
using an equivalent of the trace route command on UNIX systems. Routing messages are
sent with inadequate hop-limit values and the addresses of the devices sending the ICMP
error-messages are recorded. In the end, the attacker knows which nodes are situated on
the route to the target node. If the locations of some of the intermediary nodes are known,
one can gain information about the location of the target as well [6].
2.3.2.9 Routing Table Overflow
In a routing table overflow attack the attacker attempts to create routes to nonexistent
nodes. The goal is to create enough routes to prevent new routes from being created or to
overwhelm the protocol implementation. 
Proactive routing algorithms attempt to  discover routing information even before it  is
needed while a reactive algorithm creates a route only once it is needed. This property
appears  to  make  proactive  algorithms  more  vulnerable  to  table  overflow attacks.  An
attacker  can simply send excessive  route  advertisements  to  the  routers  in  a  network.
Reactive protocols, on the other hand, do not collect routing data in advance. For example
in AODV, two or more malicious nodes would need to cooperate to create false data
efficiently: The other node requests routes and the other one reply with forged addresses
[5].
2.4 Security Mechanisms
Most  of  the  security  services  previously  mentioned  can  be  provided  using  different
cryptographic  techniques.  The  following  subsections  give  an  overview  of  which
techniques are used to provide each of the services [5].
2.4.1 Confidentiality
The confidentiality service requires protection from eavesdropping attacks and this can be
provided using an encryption scheme. The stricter requirement implies that the service
must also provide protection against traffic analysis. Such a service will typically require
additional mechanisms along with some encryption scheme [5].
2.4.2 Integrity
The integrity service can be provided using cryptographic hash functions along with some
form of encryption. When dealing with network security the integrity service is  often
provided implicitly by the authentication service [5].
2.4.3 Authentication
Authentication can be provided using encryption along with cryptographic hash functions
[5].
2.4.4 Non-repudiation
Non-repudiation requires the use of public key cryptography to provide digital signatures.
Along with digital signatures a trusted third party must be involved [5].
2.4.5 Availability
The availability is typically ensured by redundancy, physical protection and other non-
cryptographic means, e.g. use of robust protocols [5].
2.5 Cryptographic Background
Cryptography is the study of mathematical techniques related to aspects of information
security  such  as  confidentiality,  data  integrity,  entity  authentication,  and  data  origin
authentication.
The basic service provided by cryptography is the ability to send information between
participants in a way that others cannot intercept or read it. Though there are many kinds
of  cryptography,  the  ones  most  commonly  used  are  those  based  on  representing
information as numbers and mathematically manipulating those numbers. This kind of
cryptography provides  integrity  checking  and  authentication.  This  section  provides  a
general overview of various types of cryptographic algorithms that are commonly used in
practice [8].
In traditional cryptography, a message in its original form is known as plain text or clear-
text. The encrypted information is known as cipher-text and the process of producing this
cipher-text  is  known  as  encryption.  The  reverse  process  of  encryption  is  called  as
decryption. Cryptographic systems tend to involve an algorithm and a secret value. The
secret value is known as the key. The reason for having a key in addition to an algorithm
is that it is difficult to keep devising new algorithms that will allow reversible scrambling
of information [8].
There are three-types of cryptographic functions:
 Symmetric Key Encryption
 Asymmetric Key Cryptography
 Hash Functions
2.5.1 Cryptographic Goals
The fundamental goal of cryptography is  to address the confidentiality, data  integrity,
authentication, and non-repudiation in information security.
Confidentiality is a service used to keep the content of information from all but those
authorized  to  have  it.  Data  integrity  is  a  service,  which  addresses  the  unauthorized
alteration of data. Authentication is a service related to identification. Non-repudiation is
a service, which prevents an entity from denying previous comments or actions. These
services can be used to prevent and detect cheating and other malicious activities [8]. 
In the following subsections, we will present some popular cryptographic techniques, like
symmetric-key  encryption,  asymmetric-key  encryption,  digital  signatures,  and  digital
certificates.
2.5.2 Symmetric Key Encryption
Symmetric key cryptography involves the use of a single key. Given a message (or a
plain-text),  encryption produces the cipher-text,  which is about the same length of the
plain text and decryption retrieves back the plain text, using the same key that is used for
encryption.  This  kind  of  encryption  is  also  called  as  conventional  or  secret  key
cryptography.  Symmetric  encryption  schemes  can  be  used  to  provide  confidentiality,
integrity and authentication [8].
In Figure 2.1 it is shown that a plain text is encrypted with a shared key and produced
cipher-text,  and  than  cipher-text  is  decrypted  using  the  same  shared  key  used  for
encryption and plain text is obtained.
 
Figure 2.1 Secret Key Cryptographic System [5]
Symmetric key encryption is fast and secure. However, the shared key must be distributed
over a secure communication channel.
Secret key systems provide strong authentication functionality. This implies that someone
can prove knowledge of a secret without revealing it, a functionality that is essential for
wireless systems.
Authentication  is  generally  implemented  using  a  challenge-response  mechanism.  For
example, as shown in Figure 2.2, suppose  A  and  B  wish to communicate with each
other and they decide upon a key ABK  to verify each other's identity. Each of them picks
a random number, which is known as a challenge and send it to each other. The value of
the random number, say x, encrypted with the key ABK  is known as the response to the
challenge x.  Thus, if A  and B  complete this exchange, they have proved to each other
that they know ABK  without revealing it to an imposter or an eavesdropper. This kind of
challenge-response mechanism is used in GSM and the USDC systems (and infact in
most  of  the  mobile  communication  systems)  for  authenticating  a  mobile  user.  One
apparent  flaw in  these kinds  of  systems is  that  an eavesdropper  can form challenge-
response pairs, since he/she can pose a challenge to either A or B and store the responses.
To avoid this situation it is essential that the challenges be chosen from a large enough
space, say 2128 values, so that there is no significant chance of using the same challenge
twice. Also, note that the key ABK  can also represent an algorithm ABA , which uses the
random number x and produces an encrypted value. Only A and B know the algorithm
[5].
Figure 2.2 Secret Challenge-Response Mechanisms in Secret Key Systems [5]
2.5.3 Asymmetric Key Cryptography
Asymmetric key encryption depends on two different but mathematically related keys. In
asymmetric key cryptography, the keys are not shared. Instead, each individual user has
two keys: a private key (that is not revealed to anyone) and a public key (that is open to
the  public).  This  kind  of  cryptography  is  also  commonly  called  as  Public  Key
Cryptography and  was  invented  by Diffie  and  Hellmann  in  1975.  In  these  systems,
encryption is done using the public key and decryption is done using the private key.
Figure 2.3 Information Transfer in a Public Key Cryptographic System
In Figure 2.3 it is shown that, two people,  A  and B , wishing to communicate over an
insecure channel (say a wireless channel), suppose A's <Public Key, Private Key> pair is
< Ae ;  Ad > and B's pair is < Be ; Bd  >. Assume that the public keys are known to both A
and B. It’s clear that each person encrypts the data using the other person's public key
which  can  be  decoded  by the  other  person  using  his  own private  key.  This  kind  of
encryption/decryption  is  not much  different  from secret  key systems,  but  the  biggest
benefit  of  public key systems over  secret  key systems comes from the authentication
mechanism. In the case of authentication in secret key systems, if  A  and  B  want to
communicate with each other, they have to share a secret (key  ABK  or algorithm AAB)
among  themselves.  If  one  wants  to  communicate  with  a  lot  of  entities  he/she  must
remember  a  lot  of  secret  keys  each  corresponding  to  every  entity  he  wishes  to
communicate.  Public  key cryptography comes over this  problem by the use of public
keys.  In  this  case,  the  entities  that  wish  to  communicate  with  each  other  have  to
remember only their private key. To communicate with another entity, they have to look-
up the public key of the other entity (from a directory server)  and use it  encrypt the
messages to be communicated to that entity. 
In  Figure  2.4  authentication  mechanism  is  shown  in  asymmetric  cryptography.  For
example, suppose  A  wants to verify (authenticate) B  's identity.  A  Chooses a random
number r, encrypts it using B  's public key and sends the result to B . Now, B can prove
his/her identity by decrypting the encrypted message (the challenge) using his/her private
key and sending the decrypted random number r (the response) backs to A  [8].
Figure 2.4 Authentication Mechanisms in a Public Key System
Though  public  key systems  provide  a  highly efficient  authentication  mechanism,  the
down side of public key encryption is that it tends to be very slow and resource intensive.
This makes it difficult to send large amounts of data using public key encryption. It is
typically only used to encrypt small amount of data, like digital signatures.
In  case  of  communication  networks,  these  public  key  systems  require  excessive
computations  and  transfer  of  large-number  of  bits  along  power/bandwidth-limited
channels.  So,  these  systems  were  not  initially  recommended  for  wireless/mobile
communications where bandwidth and power (and hence battery life of portable devices)
are at a premium. This is one of the main reasons that the 2nd Generation Systems like
GSM and the USDC were primarily secret key systems. But as 3rd generation systems
with higher capacities are introduced, private key systems will begin to play an important
role in providing security, authentication and access control [8].
Public key cryptography also facilitates digital signatures, whereby a person can sign a
plain text using his private key and anyone can verify the person's identity by using the
public key of that person. Further, others cannot forge the signature of the person since it
involves his private key.
2.5.2.1 Diffie-Hellman
The  Diffie-Hellman  (DH)  algorithm  was  the  first  public  key  algorithm  published.
However,  it  is  limited  to securely exchanging keys that  can subsequently be  used to
provide the security services mentioned above [5].
The DH algorithm shown in Figure 2.5 requires two public parameters, a prime p and a
generator  g  of PZ .  A generator of  PZ  is  an integer  g  such that  g, g2...  1pg  (mod  p)
generate the values 1 through p - 1 in some order. To exchange a shared key user A  and
user B generate the random secrets Ax  and Bx . User B sends By = B
xg  to A  and A  sends
Ay = A
xg  to B. A  and B can then generate the shared secret key k as:
k = BxAy  = A
x
By  = AB
xxg  (mod p)             (2.1)
Figure 2.5 Diffie-Hellman key exchange.
2.5.2.2 RSA
RSA is the initials of the three creators: “Rivest, Shamir, and Ad leman”. It is the most
widely used public-key cryptosystem. It is based on the following idea: It is very simple
to multiply numbers together, especially with computers. But it can be very difficult to
factor numbers. For example, if you multiply 34537 and 99991, it is a simple matter and
the result is 3453389167. But the reverse problem is much harder. Suppose the number is
3453389167 then it is a hard problem finding the multiplying two integers.
RSA can be used to provide confidentiality, integrity, authentication and non-repudiation
services.  The public  key  pk = {e,  n}  and the  private  key  sk = {d,  n}.  To encrypt a
message m or decrypt a cipher text c, the following calculations are performed:
 )(mod nmc e            (2.2)
  )(mod)(mod nmncm edd                  (2.3)
If the algorithm is intended to use to provide confidentiality the values n and e are made
publicly known while d is kept secret. For user A to encrypt a message intended for user
B, B’s public key  Bpk  is used for the encryption. Since only B has knowledge of the
secret key Bsk  it alone can decrypt the cipher text and recover the plain text,
 )(mod)( nccdm dskB             (2.4)
In the following example, suppose that person A  wants to make a public key, and that
person B  wants to use that key to send A  a message. In this example, we will suppose
that the message A  sends to B  be just a number. 
Here are the steps:
1. Person A  selects two prime numbers. We will use p=23 and q=41 for this example, the
real numbers should be much larger.
2. Person A  multiplies p and q together to get ( p ) ( q ) = 943. 943 is the “public key”,
which he/she tells to person B  (and any one he/she wishes).
3. Person A  also chooses another number e , which must be relatively prime to 
( 1p )( 1q ). In this case, ( 1p ) ( 1q ) = (22) (40) = 880 so e  = 7, e  is also part of
the public key, so B  also is told the value of e .
4. Now B  knows enough to encode a message to A . Suppose, for this example, that the
message is the number M  =35 
5. B  Calculates the value of C = )(mod NM e  =357 (mod 943).
6. C = 545, the number 545 is the encoding that B sends to A .
7. Now A  wants to decode 545. To do so, he needs to find a number d such that e d =1
(mod ( 1p ) ( 1q )), in this case, such that 7 d = 1(mod 880). A solution is d = 503.
8.  To  find  the  decoding,  A  must  calculate  dC  (mod  N)  = 503545  mod  943  so  the
decrypted message M  = 35.
2.5.4 Hash Functions
One of  the fundamental  primitives  in  modern cryptography is  the  cryptographic hash
function, often informally called a one-way hash function. Hash functions are also called
as message-digests  or one-way transformations.  A hash function is  a computationally
efficient function mapping binary strings of arbitrary length to binary strings of some
fixed length, called hash-values [8].
The basic idea of hashing or message digesting is to mangle the information so badly that
the process  cannot  be reversed.  A typical  example  of message digesting is  password
authentication in personal computer systems. For security reasons, the system does not
store the actual (unencrypted) password, but a hashed or digested value of it.  When a
password is supplied, the system computes the hashed or digested value of the supplied
password and compares  it  the stored hash value.  Hashing can also be used for other
functions such as message fingerprinting, digital signatures, message integrity checking
etc [5].
In communication systems we shall often require evidence that a message that has been
sent has not been subject to modification in any way. Typically this is carried out using a
hash function. A hash function H when applied to a message M  yields a value H (M) of
specific length known as the hash value of that message. H ( M ) is often referred to as a
message digest. The mapping of messages to digests is one-way; given M  and H ( M ) it
should be computationally infeasible to and M ' such that 
H ( M ') =H ( M ).            (2.5)
The digest is a form of reduced message calculated using a publicly known technique. A
receiver of a message can check whether a message and a corresponding digest agree.
Hash functions are largely intended for use in conjunction with cryptography to provide
signatures. If M is a message then A can provide evidence to B that he created it, and that
it has not been tampered with, by calculating E ( ABK : H ( M )) and sending the message
M  together with the newly calculated encrypted hash value. On receiving the message, B
can calculate H ( M ) and then E ( ABK : H ( M )) and check whether the value agrees with
the encrypted hash value received. Since the amount of encryption is small this is a quite
efficient means to demonstrate authenticity (assuming A and B do not fake messages from
the other) [5].
There are lots of messages digest algorithms; one most popular one is message digest
algorithm version 5 (MD5). Ronald Rivest  created MD5. This algorithm consists of a
number of rounds that apply different bit wise functions to get to the resulting output.
MD5 uses four rounds with each consisting of 16 steps. The output of this algorithm is a
128-bit  hash  value.  As  input  a  bit  string  of  arbitrary  length  is  accepted.  Since  the
algorithms  work  with  blocks  of  512  bits  the  input  must  be  padded.  In  addition,  to
overcome the security problem of finding different length messages with the same hash a
binary length value is concatenated to the message [8].
The most common cryptographic uses of hash functions are with digital signatures and
for  data  integrity. With  digital  signatures,  a  long message is  usually hashed (using a
publicly available hash function) and only the hash-value is signed. The party receiving
the message then hashes the received message, and verifies that the received signature is
correct  for  this  hash-value.  This  saves  both  time  and space  compared to  signing the
message directly, which would typically involve splitting the message into appropriate-
sized blocks and signing each block individually. Note here that the inability to find two
messages  with  the  same  hash-value  is  a  security  requirement,  since  otherwise,  the
signature on one message hash-value would be the same as that on another, allowing a
signer to sign one message and at a later point in time claim to have signed another [8].
At the highest level, hash functions may be split into two classes:
 Un-keyed hash functions:  this specification dictates a single input parameter (a
message).
 Keyed hash functions: this specification dictates two distinct inputs, a message
and a secret key.
2.5.4.1 Modification Detection Codes 
Modification detection code (MDC) also known as manipulation detection codes, and
less  commonly  as  message  integrity  codes  (MIC),  is  a  subclass  of  un-keyed  hash
functions. The purpose of an MDC is (informally) to provide a representative image or
hash  of  a  message,  the  end  goal  is  to  facilitate,  in  conjunction  with  additional
mechanisms data integrity assurances as required by specific applications [8].
2.5.4.2 Message Authentication Codes
Message Authentication Code (MAC) is a subclass of keyed hash functions. The purpose
of  MAC is  (informally)  to  facilitate,  without  the  use  of  any additional  mechanisms,
assurances  regarding  both  the  source  of  a  message  and  its  integrity  MAC have  two
functionally distinct parameters, a message input and a secret key [8].
2.5.4.3 Secure Hash Algorithm
Secure Hash Algorithm version (SHA-1) is based upon the MD5 algorithm. However,
since the output hash value is larger, 160 bits as opposed to 128 in MD5, it is more secure
against  brute  force  attacks.  The  internal  processing  also  provides  for  added  security
thanks to the redundancy of input words used in an expansion step [5].
2.5.5 Digital Signatures 
A digital signature is a data structure that provides proof of origin, i.e. authentication and
integrity, and depending on how it is used, it can also provide non-repudiation. Digital
signatures have many applications in information security, including authentication, data
integrity,  and  non-repudiation.  One  of  the  most  significant  applications  of  digital
signatures is the certification of public keys in large networks [8].
If user A  wants to send a message to user B , and doesn’t want it to be modified during
transmission and  B  wants to be sure that the message really came from user A . What
user A  does is that he/she computes a hash digest of the message, which he/she encrypts
with his private key Ask . He/she then sends both the message and the encrypted digest,
which is his/her signature. User B  can then verify the signature by computing the hash
digest  of the message he received and comparing it  with the digest  he/she gets when
decrypting the signature using A ’s public key Apk . If the digests are equal user B  knows
that A  sent the message and that it has not been modified since he/she signed it.
Digital Signature Generation:
If an entity A  which has a public private key pair ( Apk , Ask ) wants to generate a digital
signature for a message M :
1. Compute ~M = H ( M )            (2.6)
2. Compute *s = Ask  (
~
M )            (2.7)
Message M and signature *s  are made available to entities, which may wish to verify the
signature.
Digital Signature Verification:
If an entity B  wishes to verify a message M  and signature *s :
1. Obtain  A ’s public key Apk
2. Compute ~M = H ( M )            (2.8)
3. Compute u = Apk (
~
M ,
*s )            (2.9)
4. Verify signature if u=true
Both digital signature generation and digital signature verification is shown in Figure 2.6
 
Figure 2.6 Digital Signatures
Digital signatures are easily transportable, cannot be imitated by someone else, and can be
automatically time-stamped. The purpose of a digital signature is to provide a means for
an entity to bind its identity to a piece of information held by the entity into a tag called a
signature [8].
2.6 Threshold Cryptography
Threshold  cryptography is  distribution  of  trust.  An (n,  t  +  1)  threshold  cryptography
scheme allows n parties to share the ability to perform a cryptographic operation (e.g.,
creating a digital signature), so that any t + 1 parties can perform this operation jointly,
whereas it is infeasible for at most t parties to do so, even by collusion. For the service to
tolerate t-compromised servers employ an (n, t+1) threshold cryptography scheme and
divide the private key k of the service into n shares ( 1s , 2s , . . . ns ), assigning one share to
each server. We call ( 1s , 2s , . . ., ns )  an (n, t + 1) sharing of k.
Figure 2.7 Threshold Cryptography
2.7 Secret Sharing
Secret sharing allows a secret to be shared among a group of users (share holders) in such
a way that no single user can deduce the secret from his share alone. Only by combining a
sufficient number of the shares can the secret be reconstructed. A secret sharing scheme
where k out of n shareholders is needed to reconstruct the secret is referred to as a (n, k)
threshold scheme.
 Figure 2.8 Secret Sharing
2.7.1 Shamir’s Secret Sharing
This  (n,  k)  threshold secret  sharing scheme proposed by Adi  Shamir  [8]  is  based on
polynomial interpolation and works as follows. The secret S is to be shared among the n
shareholders identified by iid , i  = 1... n. The dealer who is the trusted party responsible
for generating the secret and distributing it to the users performs the following steps:
1. A prime p is chosen such that p>max (S, n)
2. A polynomial is f (x) = a0+a1x+a2x2+...+ak-1xk-1 is generated where 
a0=S          (2.10)
and ia i =1, 2.... k-1 is chosen randomly from pZ . 
3.The shares iS  i  =1, 2…n are generated as                                                            iS = f (
iid ) (mod p)          (2.11)
4. The shares are securely distributed to the respective shareholders
Figure 2.9 Shamir’s Interpolating Scheme
To reconstruct the secret Lagrange interpolation is used. Within knowledge of a minimum
of  k  shares  the  polynomial  f  (x)  can  be  reconstructed  and  the  secret  recovered  by
calculating f (0). The Lagrange interpolation is described below:
(2.12)
Recovering the secret S from a set of shares { 1S , 2S … KS } is equivalent to solving the
following system of linear equations. Note that any subset of k out of the n values can be
used.
f (1) = S+ a11+ a212 + ...+ ak-11k-1 = S1
f (2) = S+ a12 + a222 + ...+ ak-12k-1 = S2
:
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F (k) = S+ a1k + a2k2 + ...+ ak-1kk-1 = SK         (2.13)
Blakely’s idea is based on Euclidean spaces. If the threshold scheme is (5, 3) for example
the shared secret is in the regular three-dimensional space. The shared secret is a point in
space. Each part  or share is a plane containing the shared secret,  or  point.  If enough
number of planes exists,  that is,  we have at least k number of participants the shared
secret is the point where all planes intersect. If some shares are missing we only get a
plane or a line with the actual secret still undetermined. This can of course be generalized
into any k-dimensional space [9].
Figure 2.10 Lagrange Interpolation
It is important  that  no shareholder gains knowledge of any share other than his  own.
Otherwise he could potentially gain knowledge of k shares and then be able to reconstruct
the secret himself. Therefore a trusted party is needed to perform the reconstruction of the
secret, i.e. the shareholders provide their shares to the trusted party who performs the
action requiring the secret, e. g the signing of certificates etc.
2.7.1.1 Advantages of Secret Sharing
 Size of each share size of the secret S.
 For a fixed k, iS  pieces can be dynamically added or deleted without affecting the
other iS  pieces.
 Easy to change the  iS  shares without changing the secret S (a new polynomial
with the same free term).
 Allows  for  a  hierarchical  scheme  in  which  the  number  of  pieces  needed  to
determine S depends on their importance.
 Provide tradeoff between security and reliability according to the choice of k and
n.
2.7.1.2 Disadvantages of Secret Sharing
 An entity that computes the shares and distributes them needed: referred as dealer;
the dealer is trusted.
 An entity that combines all the pieces in order to recover the key is needed.
 The combiner becomes a central point of trust and failure.
 Once the key is recovered an insider can potentially forge the group signature, or
read messages individually.
 Need a system that provides decryption and signing without revealing the secret
key.
2.8 Proactive Secret Sharing
In the secret sharing scheme described above the secret  is  protected by distributing it
among several shareholders.  In k+1 out of n threshold schemes,  security is assured if
throughout the entire lifetime of the secret the adversary compromises no more than k of
the n location. 
However, given sufficiently long time an attacker could compromise k shareholders and
obtain their shares, thereby allowing him to reconstruct the secret. To defend against such
attackers  proactive  secret  sharing  schemes  update  the  shares  on  a  regular  basis.  An
attacker must then compromise k shareholders between the updates since only k shares
belonging to the same update period can be used to reconstruct the secret.
Proactive schemes are proposed as a countermeasure to mobile adversaries. A proactive
threshold cryptography scheme uses share refreshing, which enables servers to compute
new shares from old ones in collaboration without disclosing the service private key to
any server.  The new shares constitute  a new  ),( kn sharing of the service private key.
After refreshing, servers remove the old shares and use the new ones to generate partial
signatures. Because the new shares are independent of the old ones, the adversary cannot
combine old shares with new shares to recover the private key of the service. Thus, the
adversary is challenged to compromise k+1 server between periodic refreshing.
Share refreshing relies on the following homomorphism property.
If ( 11s , 
1
2s … 
1
ns ) is a ),( kn  sharing of 1S  and ( 21s ,
2
2s ...
2
ns ) is a ),( kn sharing of 2S , then (
1
1s , 
1
2s …
1
ns ) v is a ),( kn  sharing of S1+S2. If 2S  is 0, then we get a new (n, k) sharing of
1S . 
Given n servers, Let ( 1s , 2s … ns ) be a ),( kn sharing of the private key S of the service,
with server  i  having  is .  Assuming all servers are correct, share refreshing proceeds as
follows first, each server randomly generates 1is , 2is …. ins  is an ),( kn  sharing of 0. We
call these newly generated ijs ’s sub shares. Then, every sub share  ijs  is  distributed to
server  j  through a  secure  link.  When  server  j  gets  the  sub  shares js1 , js2 ... njs  it  can
compute a new share from these sub shares and its old share 



n
i
ijij sss
1
                                                                                            (2.14)
Figure 2.11 Proactive Share Refreshing
A variation of share refreshing also allows the key management service to change its
configuration from  ),( kn  to ),( kn  .  This way, the key management service can adapt
itself,  on the fly, to changes in the network. If a compromised server is detected, the
service should exclude the compromised server and refresh the exposed share; if a server
is  no  longer  available  or  if  a  new  server  is  added,  the  service  should  change  its
configuration accordingly. For example, a key management service may start with the (7;
3)  configuration.  If,  after  some time,  one  server  is  detected  to  be  compromised  and
another server is no longer available, then the service could change its setting to the (5; 2)
configuration.  If  two  new  servers  are  added  later,  the  service  could  change  its
configuration back to (7; 3) with the new set of servers.
The only  difference  is that now the original set of servers generate and distribute sub
shares based on the new configuration of the service: for a set of k of the n old servers,
each server  i  in this set computes an ),( kn   sharing ( 1is , 2is … ins ) of its share  is  and
distribute sub share ijs  secretly to the thj  server of the n new servers. Each new server
can then compute the new share from these sub shares. These new shares will constitute a
),( kn  sharing of the same service private key.
Note that share refreshing does not change the service key pair. Nodes in the network can
still use the same service public key to verify signed certificates. This property makes
share refreshing transparent to all nodes, hence scalable.
2.9 Verifiable Secret Sharing
If any shareholder wishes to prevent the reconstruction of the secret, he can provide an
invalid  share,  e.g.  a  random value,  to  be  used  for  the  reconstruction.  The  Lagrange
interpolation will then result in the reconstruction of a value, different from the secret S.
Verifiable secret sharing mechanisms are used to prevent this type of denial of service
attack.  These  schemes  are  based  on  hard  to  invert  homomorphism functions  and,  in
particular, on the hardness of computing discrete logarithms over pZ , for prime p.
The mechanism works as follows:
Select f (x) over pZ as in Shamir’s 
   1. f (x) = 0a + xa1 + 22 xa  + … + 
1
1


k
k xa  (mod p)         (2.15)
   2. set up p, q (q divides p-1)
           b Î Zp*, )(mod/)1( pbg qp               (2.16)
3. Witness generation (publicly known)
 iW = )(mod)(mod pg qai                     (2.17)
 as witnesses of the coefficients of the sharing    polynomial. 
4. Secret share verification
Each node can then upon receiving its share verify it by checking that  
iSg  = 0ag . iidag )( 1 ……… 11 )(  kik idag      (2.18)
Such a  scheme will  allow multiple  parties  to  renew proactively their  shares,  without
changing  the  secret.  This  method  limits  the  amount  of  damage  if  parties  get
compromised.
2.10 Threshold Signature
In the conventional digital signatures such as RSA [8] and ElGamal [2], a single signer is
sufficient to sign a message and any verifier can verify the validity of the signature with
the  signer’s  public  key.  However,  the  responsibility  of  signing  messages  for  many
applications needs to be shared by a set of signers. It is a policy for some applications and
occasions  that  at  least  k  persons  rather  than  one  person  generate  cooperatively  a
signature. The multi-signature schemes, the  ),( kn  threshold signature schemes and the
),( kn  threshold multi-signature schemes were proposed for slightly different concepts. In
these schemes,  it  is  required that  several  signers  cooperate  to  generate a  valid  group
signature for a message on behalf of the group.
Threshold signatures are digital signatures where signers can establish groups such that
only certain subsets  of the  group can produce signatures in  behalf  of the group. The
collection  of  subsets  that  are  authorized  to  produce  signatures  is  called  the  access
structure of a threshold scheme. More particularly, a ),( kn threshold signature scheme is
a  digital  signature scheme where any k or  more signers  of  a  group of  n  signers  can
produce in behalf of the group. In general, a threshold signature does not reveal the actual
group members that have co-operated to produce it. 
Multi signatures are threshold signatures with the additional feature that they reveal the
identities  of the group members who produced them. In multi  signatures,  the signing
members  are  not  anonymous  at  all.  The  special  case  of  a  (1, 1)-threshold  signature
scheme is an ordinary digital signature scheme. 
The goal of a threshold  signature scheme is  to  enforce dual  control  over  the signing
capability (choose k>1) or to eliminate single points of failure (choose n>1), or both.
Figure 2.12 Threshold Signature
3. KEY MANAGEMENT 
This chapter considers key management techniques for controlling the distribution, use,
and  update  of  cryptographic  keys.  Systems  providing  cryptographic  services  require
techniques for initialization and key distribution as well as protocols to support on-line
update of keying material, key backup/recovery, revocation, and for managing certificates
in certificate-based systems. This chapter examines techniques related to these issues.
3.1 Key Management Objectives and Threats
Key management  plays a  fundamental  role  in  cryptography as  the  basis  for  securing
cryptographic  techniques  providing  confidentiality,  entity  authentication,  data  origin
authentication,  data integrity, and digital signatures. The goal of a good cryptographic
design is to reduce more complex problems to the proper management and safe-keeping
of a small number of cryptographic keys, ultimately secured through trust in hardware or
software by physical isolation or procedural controls. Reliance on physical and procedural
security (e.g., secured rooms with isolated equipment),  tamper-resistant hardware, and
trust  in  a large number of individuals  is  minimized by concentrating trust  in  a small
number of easily monitored, controlled, and trustworthy elements [8].
The purpose of key management is to:
1. Initialize system users within a domain.
2. Generate, distribute and install keying material.
3. Control the use of keying material.
4. Update, revoke and destroy keying material.
5. Store, backup/recover and archive keying material.
Keying relationships in a communications  environment involve at  least  two parties (a
sender and a receiver) in real-time. In a storage environment, there may be only a single
party, which stores and retrieves data at distinct points in time.
The objective of key management is to maintain keying relationships and keying material
in a manner, which counters relevant threats, such as:
 • Compromise of the confidentiality of keys.
• Compromise of authenticity of secret or public keys. Authenticity requirements include
knowledge or verifiability of the true identity of the party a key is shared or associated
with.
•  Unauthorized use of secret or public keys. Examples include using a key which is no
longer valid, or for other than an intended purpose [8].
3.2 Security Policies and Key Management
Key management is usually provided within the context of a specific security policy. A
security policy explicitly or implicitly defines the threats a system is intended to address.
The policy may affect the stringency of cryptographic requirements, depending on the
susceptibility of the environment in question to various types of attack. Security policies
typically also specify:
1. Practices  and  procedures  to  be  followed  in  carrying  out  technical  and
administrative aspects of key management, both automated and manual.
2. The responsibilities and accountability of each party involved.
3. The types of records (audit trail information) to be kept, to support subsequent
reports or reviews of security-related events [8].
3.3 Simple Key Establishment Models
The  following  key  distribution  problem  motivates  more  efficient  key  establishment
models.
3.3.1 The n2 Key Distribution Problem
In a system with n users involving symmetric-key techniques, if each pair of users may
potentially need to communicate securely, then each pair must share a distinct secret key.
In this case, each party must have n - 1 secret keys; the overall number of keys in the
system, which may need to be centrally backed up, is then n (n-1)/2, or approximately 2n .
As the size of a system increases, this number becomes unacceptably large [8].
3.3.2 Point-to-Point and Centralized Key Management
Point-to-point communications and centralized key management, using key distribution
centers  or  key  translation  centers,  are  examples  of  simple  key  distribution
(communications)  models  relevant  to  symmetric-key  systems.  Here  “simple”  implies
involving at most one-third party. These are illustrated in Figure 3.1 and described below,
where XYK  denotes a symmetric key shared by X and Y [8].
Figure 3.1 Simple key distribution model
1. Point-to-Point Mechanisms: These involve two parties communicating directly. This
method is shown in Figure 3.1.
2. Key Distribution Centers (KDCs): KDCs are used to distribute keys between users,
which share  distinct  keys with  the  KDC, but  not  with  each other.  A basic  KDC
protocol proceeds as follows.
 Upon request from A to share a key with B, the KDC T  generates a key K
, then sends it encrypted under ATK  to A. This is shown in Figure 3.1.b.i.
  KDC T  also encrypts a copy of K  (for B) under BTK . Alternatively, T
may communicate K (secured under BTK ) to B directly. This is shown in
Figure 3.1.b.ii.
3. Key Translation Centers (KTCs): The assumptions and objectives of KTCs are as for
KDCs above, but here one of the parties (e.g., A) supplies the session key rather than the
trusted center. A basic KTC protocol proceeds as follows.
  A sends a key K to the KTC T  encrypted under ATK . This is shown in
Figure 3.1.c.i.
 The KTC deciphers and re-enciphers K under BTK , then returns this to A
(to relay to B) or sends it to B directly. This is shown in Figure 3.1.c.ii.
KDC’s provide centralized key generation, while KTC’s allow distributed key generation.
Both are centralized techniques in that they involve an on-line trusted server.
Point-to-point mechanisms require that A and B share a secret key a priori. Centralized
key management involving a trusted party T  requires that A and B each share a secret
key withT . These shared long-term keys are initially established by non-cryptographic,
out-of-band techniques providing confidentiality and authenticity (e.g., in person, or by
trusted courier). 
Centralized  key  management  involving  third  parties  (KDC’s  or  KTC’s)  offers  the
advantage of key-storage efficiency: each party need maintain only one long-term secret
key with  the  trusted  third  party  (rather  than  one  for  each  potential  communications
partner). Potential disadvantages include: vulnerability to loss of overall system security
if  the  central  node  is  compromised  (providing  an  attractive  target  to  adversaries);  a
performance bottleneck if the central  node becomes overloaded; loss of service if the
central node fails (a critical reliability point); and the requirement of an on-line trusted
server.
3.4 Trusted Third Parties
The success of a communication system is limited by how much trust can be placed in the
information being transmitted. For any two communicating entities, mutual trust must be
established to support effective communication. Authentication is the fundamental basis
for  building  such  trust.  In  large-scale  dynamic  networks,  where  communication  may
occur  between any two  entities,  it  is  not  feasible  to  expect  every entity to  have  the
capability to authenticate all other entities with which it might communicate. To this end,
it is necessary to provide a framework for authentication. One of the traditional ways to
support such authentication is to involve a commonly trusted third party.  [8]
A trusted third party (TTP) is an entity trusted by all users of the system and is often used
to provide the key management services mentioned above. Depending on the nature of
their involvement they can be categorized as in-line, on-line or off-line.
3.4.1 Roles of Trusted Third Parties
Trusted Third Parties (TTP’s) are classified based on their  real-time interactions with
other entities.
3.4.1.1 In-line TTP 
An in-line TTP participates actively in-between the communication path of the two users.
This is shown in Figure 3.2 [8].
Figure 3.2 In-line TTP
3.4.1.2 On-line TTP
An on-line TTP is involved in real-time during each protocol instance (communicating
with A  or B  or both), but A and B communicates directly rather than through TTP. An
on-line  TTP  participates  actively  but  only  for  management  purposes,  the  actual
communication between the users is direct. This is shown in Figure 3.3 [8].
Figure 3.3 On-line TTP
3.4.1.3 Off-line TTP
An off-line TTP communicates with the users prior to their setting up a communication
link. During the actual protocol run the off-line TTP is not active; in fact it does not even
need to be connected to the network.  Since every node in the network trusts the TTP,
authentication provided by the TTP can be trusted with a high level of confidence, as long
as the TTP remains secure and reliable. This is shown in Figure 3.4 [8].
Figure 3.4 Off-line TTP
3.5 Certificate Authority
The Certification Authority (CA) is a trusted third party whose signature on the certificate
vouches for the authenticity of the public key bound to the subject entity. The significance
of this binding (e.g.,  what  the key may be used for)  must  be provided by additional
means,  such as  an  attribute  certificate or  policy statement.  Within  the  certificate,  the
string,  which  identifies  the  subject  entity,  must  be  a  unique  name within  the  system
(distinguished name), which the CA typically associates with a real-world entity. The CA
requires its own signature key pair, the authentic public key of which is made available to
each party upon registering as an authorized system user. This CA public key allows any
system user, through certificate acquisition and verification, to transitively acquire trust in
the authenticity of the public key in any certificate signed by that CA.
Certificates are a means for transferring trust, as opposed to establishing trust originally.
The authenticity of the CA’s public key may be originally provided by non-cryptographic
means including personal acquisition, or through trusted couriers; authenticity is required,
but not secrecy [8].
3.5.2 Digital Certificate
A digital certificate is a data structure consisting of a data part and a signature part. The
data part  contains clear text  data including, as a minimum, a public key and a string
identifying  the  party  (subject entity)  to  be  associated  therewith.  The  signature  part
consists  of the digital  signature of a certification authority over the data part,  thereby
binding the subject entity’s identity to the specified public key [8]. Also there is some
additional information which the certificate data part might contain include:
1. A validity period of the public key
2. A serial number or key identifier identifying the certificate or key
3. Additional information about the subject entity (e.g., street or network address)
4. Additional information about the key (e.g., algorithm and intended use)
5. Quality measures related to the identification of the subject entity, the generation
of the key pair, or other policy issues
6. Information facilitating verification of the signature (e.g., a signature algorithm
identifier, and issuing CA’s name)
7. The status of the public key.
All these fields in digital certificate are shown in Figure 3.5.
Figure 3.5 Digital Certificate Format.
 The serial number is used to uniquely identify the certificate, and issuer name is the
name of the trusted party who has issued the certificate. The validity field specifies how
long the certificate is valid. The subject is the entity being identified by the certificate, i.e.
the entity whose public key is being certified. The next two fields contain the public key
being  certified  and  information  about  what  is  certified  will  be  to  be  used  for  (e.g.
encryption, signatures etc.). The extensions field can be used to specify any additional
information about the certificate. The signature field contains the certificates signature
along with information about the hash algorithm used etc. [1].
If Alice wants to send a secret message to Bob, so she encrypts the message using Bobs
public  key  Bobpk  that  she  has  retrieved  from  a  server.  However  the  key that  Alice
retrieved actually belongs to an attacker. The secret message, which was intended for
Bob, can now be decrypted and read by the attacker.
Digital certificates are used to prevent the type of attack described above. Basically a
digital certificate is a statement issued by some trusted party saying that it verifies that the
public  key  Apk  in  fact  belongs to  the  user  A.  The  trusted  party digitally signs  this
statement  and therefore anyone with the authentic public key of the trusted party can
verify the  certificate  and thereafter  use  Apk  and  be  sufficiently sure  that  it  actually
belongs to node A.
3.6 Public Key Infrastructure
For any two communicating entities, mutual trust must be established to support effective
communication. Authentication is the fundamental basis for building such trust. In large-
scale dynamic networks, where communication may occur between any two entities, it is
not feasible to expect every entity to have the capability to authenticate all other entities
with which it might communicate. To this end, it is necessary to provide a framework for
authentication [1].
The use of public key cryptography requires that the authenticity of the public keys can be
established.  A  straightforward  approach  requires  that  any  two  users  that  wish  to
communicate must exchange their public keys in an authenticated manner and this would
require the initial distribution of n (n-1) public keys. However, by having a trusted third
party issue certificates to each of the users only the public key of the TTP needs to be
distributed to each of the users. One of the traditional ways to support such authentication
is to involve a commonly trusted third party.
A  Public  Key Infrastructure  (PKI)  provides  the  mechanisms  needed  to  manage  such
certificates and consists of the components illustrated in Figure 3.6
Figure 3.6 Main Components of a PKI
An end entity is either a user of a certificate or the subject to which a certificate has been
issued. The certification authority (CA) is  the  component responsible  for  issuing and
revoking certificates while the registration authority (RA) is responsible for establishing
the identity of the subject of the certificate and the mapping between the subject and its
public key. The CA can implement the registration function and therefore the RA is an
optional component [1].
The following basic services should be provided by the PKI components described above:
1. Registration
2. Initialization
3. Certification
4. Key update
5. Revocation
6. Certificate and revocation notice distribution
Other services that may also be provided by the PKI include key recovery, key generation,
and cross-certification, secure time stamping and non-repudiation.
The following subsections briefly describe each of the basic services mentioned above
[1].
3.6.1 Registration
The registration service establishes the mapping between an end entity and its public key.
This typically includes providing the public key to the Registration Authority (RA) along
with  any  information  that  is  required  for  the  certificate,  e.g.  name,  e-mail  address,
organization etc. The RA may also require that the end entity prove that it possesses the
corresponding private key, e.g. by generating a digital signature. Next the RA needs to
verify the  information  received  from the  end entity.  Requiring that  the  end  entity in
person provide proof of identity such as a driver’s license or ID card could e.g. do this.
Finally when the RA has verified the identity of the end entity it contacts the CA and
request the generation of the certificate [1].
3.6.2 Initialization
Before an end entity can use the services provided by the PKI it has to be initialized with
certain  information.  The  most  important  item required  is  the  CA’s  certificate  which
contains the public key, which is needed to verify any certificates issued by the CA. Other
information could be addresses of certificate repositories and other PKI components that
the user may need to contact etc. The initialization also includes the generation of the end
entities public/private key pair [1].
3.6.3 Certification
Upon receiving a  certification  request  from the  RA,  the  CA generates  and  signs  the
certificate.  This  process  includes  filling  in  the  certificate  form  with  the  information
provided by the RA and adding any additional information required, e.g. any extensions
uses etc. The CA then digitally signs the certificate using its private key CASK  [1].
3.6.4 Key Update
Key pairs are typically only valid for a limited time, ranging from days to years depending
on the application. The key update service provides for the transition to a new key pair
and the issuing of the corresponding certificate [1].
3.6.5 Revocation
The CA is responsible for maintaining the status of the certificates it has issued. E.g. if a
certificate becomes invalid due to the compromise of the private key the CA needs to
revoke the certificate. Certificates may also need to be revoked if e.g. any information in
the certificate becomes invalid, e.g. subject name, organization etc. [1].
3.6.6 Certificate and Revocation Notice Distribution
After a certificate has been issued it needs to be made available to the owner and to other
users that  wish to use it.  After the CA generates a certificate it  can distribute it  in  a
number  of  ways,  e.g.  by  making  it  available  on  a  publicly  accessible  server  or  by
providing it to the certificate owner directly [1].
In case a certificate is revoked the PKI must provide a mechanism that informs certificate
users of this.  A common method used is  that  the CA on a regular basis  publishes  a
certificate  revocation  list  (CRL) that  lists  all  the  certificates  that  have  been revoked.
Certificate users can then use the CRL to check whether or not a certain certificate has
been revoked [1].
Figure 3.7 Example of CRL components.
A problem with CRL ’s is that the time between the compromise and the notification of a
certificate being revoked can be significant since CRL ’s are only published at regular
intervals. A different approach to revocation notification is the use of on-line revocation
notification mechanisms. These allow the certificate users to query the CA in real-time
for the status of a particular certificate. This method is called Online Certificate Status
Protocol (OCSP) [8].
4. AD HOC NETWORKING
An Ad hoc network is a collection of nodes that do not need to rely on a predefined
infrastructure to keep the network connected. Ad hoc networks can be formed, merged
together or partitioned into separate networks on the fly, without necessarily relying on a
fixed infrastructure to manage the operation. Nodes of Ad hoc networks are often mobile,
which  also  implicates  that  they  apply  wireless  communication  to  maintain  the
connectivity,  in  which  case  the  networks  are  called  as  mobile  Ad  hoc  networks
(MANET). Mobility is not, however, a requirement for nodes in Ad hoc networks, in Ad
hoc networks there may exists static and wired nodes, which may make use of services
offered by fixed infrastructure [9].
In  Ad  hoc  networks  the  communicating  nodes  do  not  necessarily  rely  on  a  fixed
infrastructure,  which  sets  new  challenges  for  the  necessary security architecture  they
apply. In addition, as Ad hoc networks are often designed for specific environments and
may have to operate with full availability even in difficult conditions, security solutions
applied in more traditional networks may not directly be suitable for protecting them [9].
4.1 Introduction
Mobile Ad hoc network is a collection of wireless mobile nodes dynamically forming a
temporary network without the use of any existing network.
Due to the limited transmission range of wireless network interfaces, multiple hops may
be needed for one node to exchange data with another across the network 
Ad  hoc  networking  is  a  networking  paradigm  for  mobile,  self-organizing  networks.
Mobile Ad hoc networking offers convenient infrastructure less communication over the
shared wireless channel. Typically the network nodes are interconnected through wireless
interfaces and unlike traditional networks lack specialized nodes, i.e. routers that handle
packet forwarding. Instead every node in the network functions as a router as well as an
application  node  and  forwards  packets  on  behalf  of  other  nodes.  There  are  a  lot  of
differences between mobile Ad hoc networks and traditional networks. Ad hoc networks
do  not  rely on  any fixed  infrastructure.  It  relies  on  each other  to  keep  the  network
connected.  Also,  the  topology of  Ad  hoc  networks  is  dynamically  changing  and  its
communication is  based on wireless links.  Due to the above characteristics, the main
challenge  in  the  design  of  mobile  Ad hoc  networks  is  their  vulnerability to  security
attacks [5].
4.2 Area of Ad hoc Networks Applications
A lot of applications may be thought of using Ad hoc networking. It is especially useful
in areas where the current fixed, infrastructure based solutions seem inflexible and over-
scaled.  The  feasible  applications  may also  include  issues  where  Ad  hoc  networking
technology could supersede the fixed architecture but there will be primarily cooperation
instead  of  competition  since  the  mobile  and  dynamic  Ad  hoc  architecture  has  huge
disadvantages - that are security, bandwidth and scalability
4.2.1 Military
The major challenges in the military field are that reliability, performance, security etc.
are even more critical than in civilian applications. A lot of publications in the field of Ad
hoc networking are actually published by military organizations.
Probably  one  of  the  hardest,  largest  and  first  applications  is  utilized  in  military
environments. The first application of Ad hoc networking was in the military domain. Ad
hoc networking enables battlefield units to communicate anywhere and anytime, without
the requirement of any fixed infrastructure. The fact that every node forwards packets
also provides for a robust network. The loss of any one unit will not disrupt the network
since there will (hopefully) be other units that can still [10].
4.2.2 Emergency Services
Another huge public application may be in the area of emergency services. Firefighters,
Police and others sometimes have to operate in areas where no information infrastructure
is  present  and  operations  still  need  to  be  coordinated.  Another  scenario  would  be  a
situation after a great natural  disaster, atomic reactor melt down or other catastrophes
where  an  existing  infrastructure  is  destroyed.  Mobile  units  could  help  to  build  up
emergency information structures [5].
4.2.3 Multimedia
Modern mobile telecommunication devices have become real wonders of miniaturization.
Almost any mobile phone has got an integrated camera, microphone, MP3 player etc.
Other multimedia applications will surely be added in the recent future. With more and
more advanced cameras, movies, pictures etc. have to be transmitted to other devices -
most likely PCs - to be able to view and edit movies on a more comfortable screen or
upload your MP3s from the PC to the phone. This may (and partially is presently done) be
done using Ad hoc technology [15].
4.2.4 Conferences
There is usually no fixed office network infrastructure when meeting with business or
research partners. To be able to exchange data and support cooperative work there is a
need  for  high-bandwidth  networking  technology that  supports  spontaneously  created
connections [15].
4.2.3 Personal Area Networks 
Personal Area Networks (PAN) is used in an even smaller range than wide area networks
(WLAN) s. They are intended to operate in a personal environment, connecting mobile
phones with each other, or with PDAs, Laptops etc. There are a lot of scenarios of using
these networks, alongside with other WLAN based solutions. The IEEE tries to establish
a standard for PANs. [15].
Another example could be when a person holding a PDA comes within communication
range of a printer. If both the PDA and the printer were Ad hoc enabled the PDA could
automatically get access to the printing services.
4.2.4 Home and Business
Throughout homes and businesses there is a huge amount of possible applications of Ad
hoc technologies. There is not really the need to replace existing infrastructures - actually
this could be quite a bad idea, given the disadvantages of Ad hoc technology concerning
bandwidth and security - but to improve existing solutions by adding Ad hoc flexibility
[15] .
4.2.5 Automation
Automation  could  definitely  profit  from  Ad  hoc  technology.  A  lot  of  scenarios  are
possible where Ad hoc technology would help.  Service robots will  become more and
more  mobile  in  the  next  years,  needing  more  advanced  mobile  communications
techniques  to  even  more  increasing  their  mobility.  These  technologies  shall  help
coordinating their work, increasing efficiency and making them independent of a fixed
communications environment [15].
4.2.6 Sensor Networks
Sensor networks are Ad hoc networks consisting of communication enabled sensor nodes.
Each such node contains one or more sensors, e.g. movement-, chemical- or heat sensors.
When a sensor is activated it relays the obtained information trough the Ad hoc network
to some central processing node where further analysis and actions can be performed.
Such sensor networks may consist of hundreds or thousands of sensors and can be used in
both military and non-military applications, e.g. surveillance, environmental monitoring
etc. [1].
Sensor networks differ significantly from the other types of Ad hoc networks described in
this section. The most significant difference is the small size, extremely limited power
resources and processing power of the sensor nodes [1].
4.2.7 Collaborative Networking
This application of Ad hoc networking may be the most intuitive. The simplest example
is when a group of people is attending a meeting and need to share information between
their laptops or Personal Data Assistant (PDA)’s. If these devices were Ad hoc enabled
they could dynamically set up a network consisting of the meeting participants and thus
enable  the  sharing  of  the  information.  Without  Ad  hoc  networking,  a  great  deal  of
configuration and setup would be required to accomplish this task [1].
4.3 Characteristics 
When designing protocols for Ad hoc networks, whether it is routing protocols or security
protocols it is important to consider the characteristics of the network.
4.3.1 Dynamic Network Topology
The  network  nodes  are  mobile  and  thus  the  topology  of  the  network  may  change
frequently. Nodes are free to move arbitrarily. Thus, the network topology is typically
multi-hop, so may change randomly and rapidly at unpredictable times Nodes may move
around within the network but the network can also be partitioned into multiple smaller
networks or be merged with other networks [1].
4.3.2 Inefficiencies and Bandwidth-Limitations 
The use of  wireless communication  typically implies  a lower bandwidth than that  of
traditional networks. This may limit  the number and size of the messages sent during
protocol execution [1].
There are matters to cope with in wireless communications that you do not have to deal
with using hard-wired technology. Cables are shielded. Wireless communication links all
share the same media (primarily air). This implies problems when two networks are very
close to each other.  Each network creates traffic.  This means interferences to  another
network. These Interferences reduce the efficiency of the affected network [15].
4.3.3 Energy Constrained Nodes
Most mobile devices are battery powered. Routing calculations and sending control and
data  packages  through  the  network  drains  energy.  It  is  important  to  keep  energy
consumption as low as possible without increasing latency too much. Another aspect is
that an energy source is often shared by multiple applications. If we take a laptop as an
example, the battery provides among other things to the processor, the storage devices
etc.  and network adapter.  It  would be totally unacceptable  if  a network adapter were
consuming  lots  of  the  battery power  and  therefore  significantly  reducing  the  overall
working time of the entire device. The factor energy will become even more important in
the future since the growing cycles of battery lifetime cannot keep up with the growth
rates of bandwidth and processing power [15].
4.3.4 Limited Physical Security
The use of wireless communication and the exposure of the network nodes increase the
possibility of attacks against the network. Due to the mobility of the nodes the risk of
them being physically compromised by theft, loss or other means will probably be bigger
than for traditional network nodes [1].
Wireless communication is  much more vulnerable to security issues (denial-of-service
attacks, bugging etc.) than hard-wired connections since the physical media cannot be
protected from foreign access [15].
4.3.5 Network Origin
This aspect effects what assumptions or prerequisites that can be made on the nodes in
the network. E.g. if it is a planned Ad hoc network, it can perhaps be assumed that the
nodes can be supplied with some initial data structures such as certificates, passwords,
user names etc. However, if the network is spontaneous no such assumptions can be made
[1].
4.3.6 Network Range
Depending on the actual physical topology, Ad hoc network can be formed localized or
distributed manner. In localized mode the network nodes are within physical range, e.g.
the same room [1].
In distributed mode, the nodes are distributed over a large area without the possibility of
physically interacting. Depending on the actual physical topology and distribution of the
nodes in the Ad hoc network, certain techniques may not be applicable. The most obvious
situation is  a technique that  requires physical interaction.  Such a technique obviously
cannot be used in a highly distributed Ad hoc network [1].
4.3.7 Network Capabilities
Depending on the nodes capabilities Ad hoc network can be formed uniform or, diverse.
In uniform mode all nodes have approximately the same capabilities in terms of power
source, CPU performance and memory size etc. 
In diverse mode the nodes’ capabilities differ significantly, certain nodes may be high-end
computers while other are embedded devices.
If the capabilities of the nodes in the network are diverse, certain techniques may not be
directly applicable. A certain technique may be applicable to a subset of the nodes but
completely unusable on the rest of the nodes. An example of this could be the use of
public key cryptography; although this is not an issue for high-end CPU’s it may not be
feasible for embedded devices [1].
4.3.8 Network Transience
Depending on the longevity of Ad hoc network it may be constructed as short term or,
long term.
In short termed mode, nodes come together once and create an Ad hoc network, when
finished  no  knowledge is  kept  about  the  other  nodes.  These  networks  typically only
persist during a relatively short time period, i.e. less than a few hours [1].
In long termed mode, the same nodes will probably be part of the same Ad hoc network
multiple times and therefore save information about the other nodes for future use. These
networks will persist during a longer time period. This also includes Ad hoc networks
that may only persist during a short time period, but that instead are created frequently
[1].
The longevity of the Ad hoc network may influence the allowed complexity of some
initialization phase. E.g. for a network consisting of nodes that will frequently join in an
Ad hoc network it may be tolerable with a more complex initialization phase than that of
a network that will only last for a short time and will not reoccur [1].
4.4 Routing
The routing of data packets in computer networks is the process of moving information
from a source to a given destination. The way to do this in the best way possible is the
concern of the routing algorithm used. In the case of wired networks the main routing
algorithms used are either distance vector routing or link state routing [16].
4.4.1 General Routing Principles
Routing has been going on in large networks, as the Internet, for quite some time and lots
of different routing algorithms has been proposed and tested. The main categories that
have survived and have been in large use are those described below.
These are performing well in wired networks, but some problems still exists [10].
4.4.1.1 Distance Vector Routing
A distance  vector  routing algorithm is  a  distributed algorithm that  is  quite  simple  to
implement and has low computational demands. It basically means that each router has a
way of knowing about its neighbors. The router knows the metric of each link to those
neighbors. The metric can be of any type, for example delay or similar [10].
Also, each router has a distance vector, that is, a table of distances, to each destination
available  and  which  outgoing  link  to  use.  All  the  neighboring  routers  exchange
information between each other based on what they know about their neighbors and what
they told them. Each time a router receives an update from a neighboring router it updates
its own vector with the minimum distances. If some values are changed the router in turn,
sends out an update to all its neighbors [10].
Distance vector routing is commonly known to have problems with changing topology.
Especially a problem known as the count-to-infinity problem which makes the routers
construct an ever growing path to a node that has gone down or a link to that node being
broken.  The  algorithm  can  also  converge  slowly  on  changing  topology,  and  while
converging, create routing loops [10].
4.4.1.2 Link State Routing
Instead of depending on every neighbor to gradually give information about how to get to
all the destinations, the link state routing algorithm gets a complete picture of the entire
network and locally calculates the shortest path to every destination [10].
This means that for each router to get information about every link all the routers must
broadcast (flood) the information that they have to all others [10].
When all the information needed is collected the process of finding the shortest path can
begin. This is accomplished using Dijkstra’s or Prim’s algorithm. To be able to compute
the  shortest  path  all  nodes  need  to  have  a  complete  view  of  the  network  and  then
performs the computations locally. This makes these kinds of algorithm global routing
algorithms in comparison to the distributed or decentralized distance vector algorithms
[10].
As has been stated this kind of algorithm demands a complete view over the network,
which makes the number of messages, needed to be sent between all routers relatively high.
Also, the computation of the shortest path problems using Dijkstra’s algorithm is in the order of
O ( 2n ) [10].
4.4.2 Routing in Ad hoc networks
In the case of a mobile Ad hoc network the topology is highly dynamic. This leads to
quickly changing link states. Some links get broken while other pairs create other links
[10]. In Figure 4.1 the mobile host 1 (MH1) is moving from the vicinity of MH2. As it
gets closer to MH7 and MH8 new links are established to these hosts. These characteristics
are different from the one that appears in most wired networks. The routing algorithms
used in the wired case have problems with topology changes, and if these happen often
the problems is just getting worse [16].
Another problem that arises in wireless networks that is not as common in wired routing
is the asymmetrical links. That is, one node can reach another but the return path is not
the same.
Figure 4.1 An Ad hoc network of mobile nodes [16].
4.4.2.1 Destination-Sequenced Distance Vector Protocol
Destination-Sequenced Distance Vector (DSDV) is an Ad hoc version of the commonly
known distance vector algorithm. To overcome the problems with slow convergence in
the  ordinary  distance  vector  algorithm  and  prevent  routing  loops  in  highly  dynamic
topologies this algorithm adds a sequence number to the routing table entries [16].
The destination nodes update the sequence numbers when new links to them are detected.
Also,  when  a  node  detects  a  broken link  it  sends  this  out  together  with  an  updated
sequence number. The receiving nodes check for higher or equal sequence numbers. If a
route update packet is received with lower sequence number it is discarded. In the case of
a sequence number that is equal to the one already held the metric is checked to see if it is
better or worse [16].
To save bandwidth the protocol uses two types of route update messages. First one is a
full dump that a node sends to all its neighbors. These messages contain the complete
routing table. The other variant is an incremental update, which only updates the routes
that has changed since the last full update. In this way it is possible to send only small
packets,  conserving  bandwidth  and  transmission  time  for  most  cases.  When  these
incremental updates are getting too big the node can send a full dump instead in hope to
be able to send smaller packets after that [16].
To get rid of the possibility of an oscillating system update messages are only sent out
after  a  delay.  After  this  delay the  routing  information  has  stabilized  and  is  not  that
sensitive to oscillation. The delay is computed using a running, weighted average over the
most recent updates [12].
Since the topology might change the route update messages are sent out at certain time
intervals. However, there is no need for synchronizing the different nodes as the update
events are handled asynchronous. The use of these repeating update messages keeps all
the nodes busy when not in need for communication. However, when the needs arrive all
nodes  are  ready to  forward  the  data  directly.  The  DSDV  algorithm  gets  rid  of  the
undesirable properties that the original algorithm possesses. It propagates the bad news of
broken links fast and keeps the path updates stable. Also, using the sequence number
rules for updating distance vector values it guarantees loop-free paths to each destinations
at all times [10].
4.4.2.2 Dynamic Source Routing
The Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) protocol is completely demand based. It does not
need any kind of periodic updates or node announcement messages. Instead, the protocol
acquires the needed routing information on demand [13].
The routing protocol is divided into two parts. The first is the route discovery and the
second is route maintenance. The discovery phase is initiated when a node needs to send
information to  another node that  is  not  available  in  its  current  path  cache.  The node
broadcasts a special  discovery packet  with the destination and a unique identification
number. All nodes within the wireless transmission range receive the packet. They, if they
are not  the  destination,  add  their  node  address  to  the  path  in  the  packet  header  and
retransmit the discovery packet. A packet with the same identity as has already been seen
is  discarded.  Also,  if  the  node  itself  is  mentioned  in  the  path  header  the  packet  is
discarded. This technique efficiently cuts down on duplicate packets in the air. This is
shown in Figure 4.2
Figure 4.2 DSR route discovery examples with mobile host 1 as the initiator and 8 as the
target.
When the packet finally finds its way to the destination, the destination node returns a
route reply. The reply is sent using the routing cache if present. Otherwise a new route
discovery is initiated but in this case with the route reply piggy backed on the discovery
packet. If this piggy backing is not allowed there is a great risk of infinite looping of route
discoveries. Another way is to reverse the source path collected by the route discovery;
however, this takes for granted that all links are bi-directional which may not always be
the case [12].
After a path has been discovered the second phase of the protocol is in use. This is the
maintenance phase. During this phase all communications are done using the previously
found paths.  Each node on the path is  responsible  for  resending packets  that  are not
acknowledged by the next hop node. After a maximum limit number of retries a route
error message is sent back to the source node indicating that the path is broken [12].
A number of different optimizations of the protocol are possible. For example, each node
on a path that is not actually originating a route discovery can cache some part of the
messages that they see go by. This can speed up route discovery but may also place some
overhead on the software and the processing time of the processor [13].
4.4.2.3 Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector Routing
In contrast  to the DSDV, the Ad hoc On Demand Distance Vector (AODV) is an on
demand protocol.  It  borrows the idea of  route  discovery and maintenance  from DSR
while still using a distance vector approach to the routing [11].
Each node keeps a distance vector for each known destination and its next hop neighbors.
If a destination that is needed is not in the list a route discovery is initiated. By issuing a
broadcast  packet  to  its  neighbors  containing  source  and  destination  addresses  and  a
sequence number the node hopes to find a path to the destination.
If a node, that is not the actual destination, receives a request it checks its own routing
table. If it can find the destination there it replies to the source node with this information.
If, however, this information is not in the node’s routing table it adds the source as a
destination in its own table using appropriate hop count, increments the request packet’s
hop count and rebroadcasts it to its neighbors. This is shown is Figure 4.3  [13].
Figure 4.3 Simplified route discovery example in AODV. Host S is the initiator of the
route request (RREQ) and the destination is host D.
This procedure is continued until the destination is reached and a route reply packet is
sent back to the source. After this all data traffic is routed using the discovered path. If the
nodes move and some links break a route error packet is sent out to tell the nodes that the
path is no longer available. If this happens the source node initiates a new route request
[12].
To eliminate the need of flooding a large network with route request packages the time to
live field is used to limit the number of hops a route request can be sent. If a request fails
this  is  gradually incremented  until  the  destination  is  reached.  This  approach  is  called
expanding ring search [13].
The AODV protocol can only handle symmetrical links but has the ability to also be used
in multi  cast  groups.  Additionally it  supports  a hello  message,  a variant  of  the route
request message, which is used to detect the one-hop neighbors. This may not be used if
the lower layers already support this kind of service [13].
4.4.2.4 Cluster-Based Networks
In some situations the network may be small, that is, consist of a small number of nodes.
In this case the above-mentioned routing algorithms may be adequate.
However,  if  the  network  grows  and  the  number  of  nodes  are  large  there  may  be
unnecessary overhead and the network diameter, the number of hops, may become too
large to handle straight on [12].
In  the  case  of  wired  networks  area  controllers  are  used  to  manage  a  limited  set  of
computers and routing between these are done using some backbone infrastructure [12].
This makes the network manageable for each smaller cluster and the network diameter
might become smaller using the backbone routers. However, administrative personnel do
the setup of these area controllers often during the design of the network. This is clearly
not something that can be done as easily in mobile Ad hoc networks. There are some
ideas  and techniques  available  that  manages  to  accomplish  these  goals  automatically
using distributed algorithms and elections of cluster heads.
The idea of using clusters is beneficial in many ways. It can be used to group nodes into
clusters  that  are  separated  to  nearby  clusters  by  transmission  frequency  or  spread
spectrum coding. This way the congestion can be lowered [12].
4.4.3 Secure Routing
The Secure Routing Protocol (SRP) proposed by Papadimitriou and Haas [12] is mainly
focused on the route discovery process. The routing protocols mentioned in earlier section
were not concerned at all with security and there are many attacks available to disrupt the
network connectivity by targeting the routing protocol.
The SRP uses  symmetric  cryptography, which  is  efficient  for  message authentication
codes between the peer nodes in a communication channel. The intermediate nodes need
not do anything but pass on the routing request and data traffic.
This does, however, imply the availability of shared secrets between every two nodes that
are to communicate with each other. The problem of key distribution is not addressed in
[12] other than using key negotiation algorithms such as for example the Elliptic Curve
Diffie-Hellman algorithm.
SRP can be added to a number of different routing protocols quite easily but in [12]
Papadimitriou and Haas describes the setting using a DSR like protocol as base.  The
basic  assumption  is  the  knowledge  of  a  shared  key  that  can  be  used  initially  for
authentication of the peer nodes and the correct routing information. 
Later on during the actual information exchange the keys can be used for integrity and
privacy of the data, thus creating a secure channel.
Many reactive routing protocols, including DSR, DSDV, and AODV uses monotonically
increasing  sequence  numbers  to  identify  requests  and  suppress  duplicate  packages
flooding the network. The use of these sequence numbers enables attacks such as the
rushing attack.  The need for this  ability is  great and even SRP uses it.  In addition  a
random request identifier is also added to the message. This way the rushing attack has a
low probability of succeeding since the identifier used are hard to foresee. The use of this
random number does involve the use of a secure pseudo random number generator in
each node initiating a route request.
When the source node creates the route request message the non-mutable fields of the IP
packet, the source address, the sequence number, the random identifier, and the shared
key are all input to a hashing algorithm. The hash is also part of the SRP header. The
request  is  flooded out,  as  is  done  in  most  reactive  protocols,  to  all  neighbors.  Each
neighbor adds itself to the list of nodes on the path and forwards the message. There is no
need for each intermediate node to do any cryptographic or otherwise computationally
expensive operation. When the target node receives the route request it verifies that the
request indeed comes from the correct source, a source with which it shares a secret key.
It then constructs a route reply and creates the MAC using the complete path information
as input to the hash algorithm. It then sends the route reply back in the reverse path it
came on. One-strength of Ad hoc networks is the redundancy, which is taken advantage
of in SRP. The target will receive multiple route requests from different routes. It can
reply to  each of  these  giving the source node the ability to  choose one  of the  many
alternatives. 
The target  will  have  to  limit  the  number of  replies  so  that  a  malicious  node  cannot
consume too much bandwidth or resources by forwarding spoofed route requests.
When the source node receives the route replies it can validate the correctness of the route
by verifying the MAC. Since the reply was routed using the path information in the reply
packet the source node can be certain that the route was actually followed and correct. So
far so good, to ensure communication with the target the source can choose one or more
of the routes that did get back. Even if an adversary drops all data traffic on a given route
another route can be chosen. 
This works as long as there are enough benign nodes in the network. To further take
advantage  of  the  redundancy  the  ability  to  use  diversity  coding  can  make  the
communications even more reliable. In diversity coding the techniques of error correcting
codes and redundant  information  is  used.  The actual  data  is  split  up  and sent  along
multiple different routes. When the target receives the pieces it can combine them to the
complete message even though not all of the pieces arrived correctly or at all [19].
5. SECURITY IN AD HOC NETWORKS
Ad hoc networking has been a field of very active research in recent years. However,
most of the research has been focused around various protocols for multi-hop routing,
leaving the area of security most unexplored.
5.1 Needs for Security
The actual needed security will depend on the type of application and the value of the
information that travels in the network. This is always a trade-off that must be considered
for any type of security system, Is it worth the money to build or implement a secure
system when there is no valuable information flowing around. For how long must the
information be safe forever or is it just tactical real time information that is worthless in a
few hours  or  so.  These  question  and many more  are  needed to  be  considered  when
making a secure system [17].
Some ideas of the need for security in different types of applications are given below,
ranging from low to extremely high security needs. What must be added is the need for
making the systems practically usable, which often leads to in the form of human beings
[17].
5.1.1 Home Networking
For  a  home network  connecting the  TV,  stereo,  VCR,  DVD player etc.  to  a  remote
control the need for security might not be that high. Of course, the integrity aware people
might not like the idea of neighbors being able to listen in on the control traffic and
conclude what shows are being recorded and so on. However, these are more of a comfort
issue than a real security threat. Also, it should not be possible for a bypassing individual
that bought a remote control of the same brand to control the appliances.
On the other hand, if the network is expanded to include control over the burglar alarm
and carport  some additional security measures must be taken. With such addition the
value of the protected information, the house and all the appliances included, increases
and so does the need for keeping the network safe [15].
5.1.2 Emergency Services
In the case of emergency services using an Ad hoc network for their communication the
main need is the availability. For disaster areas there is probably no real need for securing
the actual traffic since the most important thing is to be able to direct and control the
rescue teams.
In the case of terrorist attacks the network should also protect the integrity and be safe
against radio jamming since these attacks otherwise may lead to even worse situations.
To go further along these lines,  for a police squad trying to get  control  of a  hostage
situation the need for them to hide their communication from the kidnapper is vital. On
the other hand, some communications might also need to be kept from the journalists
until certain investigations are over [18].
5.1.3 Military Applications
The highest need for security is probably within the military tactics. An Ad hoc network
in the battlefield can be very valuable to the enemy if they can get hold of a node. This is
worth a lot and therefore the attacker might not stop at any costly attack method. This
implies that the security of the network must be high enough that even the most advanced
and expensive attack will not jeopardize the security of the network [1].
5.1.4 Physical Security
The need to secure information has mostly been addressed in the context of traffic flow.
In the case of small  mobile devices the aspect  of physical security is even higher.  A
stationary node can be locked in using locks and chains  but  this  will  not  be a valid
solution for a mobile device. This poses some extra security related problems on Ad hoc
nodes. Since they cannot be physically protected in the same way as other equipment
solutions based on tamper proofed chips are proposed [1].
Such solutions can provide for some safety of the data even in the case of theft of the
device.
5.2 Key Management in Ad hoc Networks
Any successful key management framework for Ad hoc networks requires fault tolerance,
security,  and  availability.  These  terms  are  sometimes  used  interchangeably,  mainly
because they are not independent of each other. To avoid confusion, we clearly define
these terms and apply them to some existing approaches for evaluation.
5.2.1 Fault Tolerance
The main concern of fault tolerance is the capability to maintain correct operation in the
presence of faulty nodes. We restrict the definition of faulty nodes to observable faults. If
a node is malfunctioning and other nodes can observe such malfunctions, a certain level
of recovery is possible. We employ intelligent replication using threshold cryptography to
provide tolerance of faulty nodes [23].
5.2.2 Security
Acting as the trust anchor for the whole network, framework should be secure against
malicious nodes or adversaries. While it may not be possible to be resistant to all levels of
attacks,  there  should  be  a  clear  threshold  of  attacks  a  system  can  withstand  while
operating normally [23].
5.2.3 Availability
Traditionally, the term availability has been used in conjunction with fault tolerance. But
in  Ad hoc  networks  availability  is  also  highly dependent  on  the  connectivity of  the
network. In wired networks, if there are no faulty or compromised nodes, the system is by
definition available for clients since connectivity is not a problem. In Ad hoc networks,
even when there are no faulty or compromised nodes, clients may not be able to contact
the desired services due to inconsistent connectivity [23].
The simplest approach to providing Certificate Authority (CA) functionality in an Ad hoc
network is to assign a single node to be the CA. The success of this scheme depends on
that single CA node. This approach is not fault tolerant, since failure of one node breaks
the system. Similarly this approach is highly vulnerable, since an adversary needs only
compromise one node to acquire the secret key. Finally, given the expected mobility and
unpredictability of Ad hoc networks, it may be possible that nodes will not be able to
reach the CA in a timely fashion, making availability very unpredictable [23].
Therefore, a single CA cannot effectively service a whole Ad hoc network.
Robustness, which is missing in the single CA scheme, can be achieved by replicating a
fully functional CA on r different nodes. With r replicas, the system can withstand (r - 1)
failures because the CA service is available as long as there is at least one operational
CA.
Availability has also been improved since a client node has a better chance of reaching
one of r CA’s to get service. Unfortunately, the system has become more vulnerable. An
adversary needs only compromise one of the r CA nodes to acquire the secret key and so
compromise the whole system. Therefore, using replicated CA’s is not a viable solution
in Ad hoc networks. The problem of using replicated CA’s stems from the fact that each
replica has full knowledge of the system secret.
Zhou and Haas first  proposed to use threshold cryptography to securely distribute the
CA’s private key over multiple nodes to form a collective CA service [4]. Using k out of
n secret sharing can provide a good level of fault tolerance and security. They address the
problem clearly and present conceptual design issues, but do not address the problem of
availability in their work. Again, connectivity between clients and the distributed CA’s
was not a concern.
Kong and others address availability by making all  M  nodes in the network share CA
functionality [24].  A client need only contact  k  out  of  M  nodes to  get  a certification
service. Assuming there are k nodes in a client’s one hop neighborhood, the client can get
a certification service cheaply by using a one-hop broadcast for the request. While this
solution addresses  availability and fault  tolerance,  it  compromises  the security of  the
system. In general, the gap between k and n in secret sharing schemes defines the security
of the system.  k  can be chosen between 1 and  n  in any secret sharing scheme. As  k
approaches  n, thus closing the gap between  k  and  n, the system becomes more secure
because an adversary needs to compromise at least k nodes to collapse the system. But if
k is too large, the system becomes less available to clients and also less tolerant to faults.
When  k  approaches  1,  making  the  gap larger,  the  effect  is  reversed  and  the  system
becomes more available but also less secure. Kong chose to keep  k  relatively small to
address  the  availability  problem  and  ended  up  with  a  vulnerable  system  where  any
adversary need only compromise a small number of nodes in the network to collapse the
service.
Hubaux and others propose another notable scheme [12].  In their scheme, there is no
concept of a CA. Every node acts as its own CA, similar to the PGP “Web of Trust”
model. The main difference between PGP and their scheme is that there is no longer a
well-known certificate directory where all certificates are stored. Rather, every user in the
system  carries  a  part  of  the  certificate  directory.  In  PGP,  when  two  users  wish  to
authenticate  each  other,  they  must  search  the  certificate  directory  for  a  chain  of
certificates that links both users. In Hub ax’s scheme, this problem is transformed into
finding an intersecting point between the certificate chains carried by each user. Hubaux
proposed a shortcut-hunter algorithm for this problem. While their approach is practical
for the totally self-organizing networks they aimed at, it has the inherent problem of no
definite trust anchor like the CA in other CA-based PKI approaches [12].
Therefore, it is not meaningful to evaluate this scheme using our framework.
5.3 Distributed Key Management
As noted many times before is the problem of usage of on line trusted parties, key servers,
and CA’s.  To address  this  specific  problem it  has  been suggested  that  the  CA’s  are
replicated and therefore available to a larger extent. Even though it is more available it is
also more vulnerable. If an adversary can compromise one CA all the secrets kept in that,
and all the others, are also compromised thus weakening the security in the system at
large.
One solution is that of threshold cryptography that was introduced by Zhou and Haas [4]
introduce a distributed key management service based on this. The service at large has a
public key known to all nodes in the system. The nodes trust certificates signed by the
service’s private key. The nodes can query the service in  the system to get the other
nodes’ public keys. The nodes can also submit update requests to update their own public
keys.
The service consists of n special nodes in a threshold (n, k+1) configuration where 
n ≥3k + 1. These nodes are the servers of the service. The servers themselves also have
public keys to the other servers and thus are able to construct secure channels between
themselves. The threshold scheme allows for an adversary to compromise up to k servers
in  any  period  of  time.  However,  the  assumption  is  that  the  adversary  lacks  the
computational power to break the cryptographic schemes that are used [20].
In this key management service the servers share the ability to sign certificates. When the
service is requested each available server partially signs the certificate.
Any combiner node to retrieve the complete signature combines these partial signatures.
In the case of compromised servers the combiner can check the validity using the public
key of  the service and if  it  is  not  valid  the combiner node tries  another  set  of k+ 1
signatures. The combiner itself need not know any secret and can thus be any node in the
network.
The actual threshold scheme used can be any that fulfils the requirements set up. To be
more robust the scheme employs share refreshing and allows for automatic adaptation of
the configuration. Thus when non-compromised servers identify compromised one they
can change the threshold scheme to exclude them. 
The share refreshment allows the servers to compute new shares from the old one that
they already hold. In addition, since the new shares are independent of the old shares a
compromised server cannot use the old shares in any combination with the new shares to
sign a certificate. They’re by forcing the adversary to compromise another set of k + 1
server between each update [20].
The usage of threshold cryptography is very promising and fits nicely into the ideas of
non-centralized  services.  However,  there  are  large  demands  on  signature  validation,
which might not fit small nodes with limited computational power that well [23].
5. 4 Self-Organized Public Key Infrastructure
One way to  overcome the centralized  issues  in  PKI using CA’s was to  let  the users
themselves provide the certificates as is done in  Pretty Good  Privacy (PGP). However,
PGP itself still suffers from the problem of distributing the certificates using public key-
servers, which are kind of centralized servers that need special treatment as such. To be
really decentralized this storage must be accomplished without the need for any specially
treated nodes. This is where the self-organized PKI comes in. 
Using the same web of trust idea as PGP this approach puts the public certificates at each
user. However, all users cannot know about every certificate and every other user. Instead
each user hold a small number of certificates and when needed merge these certificates
with some other node together getting enough certificates to enable the verification of a
public key using a trust chain in the merged set of certificates.
In their paper [12] Hubaux, Buttyán, and İ.Capkun describe a graph algorithm in which
each  user,  using  only locally  available  information,  calculates  a  sub  graph  from  the
complete trust graph. The algorithm, which they call “The Shortcut Hunter algorithm,”
proves to give quite good results when running it on actual PGP trust graphs. It gives a
scalable,  decentralized  solution  to  the  problem  of  PKI  certificate  distribution.  They
showed that the probability of two nodes’ merged certificate lists holds a certificate chain
between the two of them was high using a relatively small number of certificates in each
node. Of course, this relates to the size of the complete trust graph and the assumption of
it to be connected [12]. 
As is the case for all such trust graphs it  is possible to extract information about that
knows whom, or at least who trusts whom. This is the foundation of the decentralized
certificate authority approach but may be used in malicious ways by adversaries.
6. PARTIALLY DISTRIBUTED CERTIFICATE AUTHORITY
This solution proposed by Zhou and Hass [12] uses a (n, k) threshold scheme to distribute
the services of the certificate authority to a set of specialized server nodes. Each of these
nodes is  capable  of generating a  partial  certificate using their  share of  the certificate
signing key CAsk , but only by combining k such partial certificates can a valid certificate
be obtained.
The solution is suitable for planned, long-term Ad hoc networks. Since it is based on
public key encryption it  requires that the all  the nodes are capable of performing the
necessary computations.
Finally it assumes that a subset of the nodes is willing or able to take on the specialized
server role.
6.1 System Overview
The system contains three types of nodes; client, server and combiner nodes. The client
nodes are the normal users of the network while the server and combiner nodes are part of
the  certificate  authority.  The  server  nodes  are  responsible  for  generating  partial
certificates and storing certificates in a directory structure allowing client nodes to request
for the certificates of other nodes. The combiner nodes, which are also server nodes, are
responsible for combining the partial  certificates into a valid certificate.  Although not
stated implicitly by the authors the system also has an administrative authority, which will
be termed the dealer. The dealer is the only entity in the system that has knowledge of the
complete certificate-signing key CAsk [12].
Every node in the network has a public/private key pair and it is the responsibility of the
dealer to issue the initial certificate for the nodes public key as well as distributing the
public key CApk of the certificate authority, which is needed to verify the certificates [12].
The certificate authority as a whole has a public/private key pair, CApk / CAsk of which the
public key is  known to all  network nodes.  The private key CAsk  is  shared among the
server nodes according to Shamir’s secret sharing scheme [12].
Figure 6.1 illustrates the different components of the system.
Figure 6.1 System architecture showing three server nodes of which one is also a
combiner.
6.2 Certificate Issuing
Before any node may join the network it must first obtain a valid certificate from the
dealer off-line. At the same time the node should be supplied with the CA’s certificate
along with any other parameters that are required [12].
6.3 Certificate Renewal
The certificates are only valid for a certain amount of time and therefore need to be
renewed before they expire. When a node wishes to renew its certificate, it must request a
certificate renewal from a minimum of k server nodes. If the request is granted, each of
these  k  server  nodes  generates a  partial  certificate  with a new expiration date.  These
partial certificates are then sent to a combiner, which could be one of the k servers, which
then combines the partial certificates [12].
If any of the servers are compromised they may generate an invalid partial certificate,
which they then send to the combiner. The certificate produced by the combiner will then
also be invalid. Verifying the validity of the certificate before accepting it prevents this
type of denial of service attack. If the combiner detects that the certificate is invalid it will
request a new set of partial certificates until a valid certificate is obtained [12].
If a node changes its private/public key pair it will need to update its certificate with the
new public key, this is accomplished in a similar way as the renewal.
6.4 Certificate Retrieval
The server nodes are responsible for storing the certificates of all nodes in the network.
This allows any nodes requiring the public key of any other nodes to simply request the
corresponding certificate from any of the server nodes.
This service requires that all nodes must register their certificate with the servers when
they initially join the network. The servers must also have a mechanism of synchronizing
their certificate directories in the case of updates and renewal [12].
6.5 System Maintenance
The maintenance of the certificate authority consists of two main parts, the issuing of the
initial shares and the proactive update of the shares to protect against mobile adversaries.
The share update can also allow the system to change its configuration, e.g. from a (3, 8)
to a (2, 5) threshold scheme. This could be useful e.g. if some of the servers have been
compromised or for some other reason are unavailable [12].
During the bootstrapping of the network the dealer generates n shares of the CA’s private
key CAsk .
At periodic intervals the servers update their shares of the CA’s private key CAsk . At the
beginning of the update, each server generates a random (n, k) sharing of 0 and distributes
a share to each of the other servers, each of these shares are called sub shares. Each server
now has  n  sub shares from different servers, which are added to their old share giving
them they’re new updated share [12].
During the share update a malicious server can potentially launch a denial  of service
attack against the distributed CA by generating invalid sub shares. When the other servers
use these to update their old shares the updated share will also be invalid, effectively
preventing the correct generation of certificates. To prevent such an attack the authors
propose using a verifiable secret sharing scheme. This allows the servers to validate each
of the sub shares before using them [12].
Due  to  the  highly  dynamic  topology of  Ad  hoc  networks,  all  servers  might  not  be
connected during the share update. Therefore, mechanisms must be in place to handle
such situations. An example would be if the network were segmented into two parts. The
servers in each part may update their shares independently of each other. If the network
later merges, the shares held by the servers will be inconsistent. The authors mention a
mechanism that deals with this but no details about it are given [23].
7. FULLY DISTRIBUTED CERTIFICATE AUTHORITY
This solution is first described by Lou and Lu in [2] and later analyzed by Lou et al in
[24]. It uses a (n, k) threshold scheme to distribute an RSA certificate-signing key to all
nodes in the network. It also uses verifiable and proactive secret sharing mechanisms to
protect against denial of service attacks and compromise of the certificate-signing key.
This solution is aimed towards planned, long-term Ad hoc networks with nodes capable
of public key encryption. However, since the service is distributed among all the nodes
when they join the network, there is no need to elect or choose any specialized server
nodes.
7.1 System Overview
In this solution, the capabilities of the CA are distributed to all  nodes in the Ad hoc
network, see figure 7.1. Any operations requiring the CA’s private key CAsk can only be
performed by a coalition of k or more nodes.
The services provided by the CA can be grouped as certificate related services and system
maintenance  services.  The  certificate  related  services  include  certificate  renewal  and
revocation.
The system maintenance services include incorporating joining nodes into the CA, i.e.
provide them with their share of the CA’s private key CAsk . This service is called share
initialization [2].
The system maintenance also includes proactively updating the shares of the CA’s private
key to protect it from being compromised. This service is termed share update.
Figure 7.1 Fully distributed CA service where all nodes in the network are equal and
each holds a share of the signing key.
The availability of the service is based on the assumption that every node will have a
minimum of k one-hop neighbors and that the nodes are provided with a valid certificate
prior to their joining the network. The system then provides services to maintain and
update these initial certificates [2].
7.2 System Maintenance
This section describes the steps required to setup and maintain the distributed CA service.
The maintenance is required to handle the joining of new nodes and to protect the service
against attackers who try to compromise the CA service.
7.2.1 System Bootstrapping
During the system-bootstrapping phase, the administrative authority responsible for the
Ad hoc network (known as  the dealer)  initializes  the first  k  nodes.  The initialization
includes providing the nodes with their own certificates idcert , the CA’s certificate CAcert
and their shares of the CA’s secret key CAsk .  The bootstrapping phase is illustrated in
Figure 7.2 where,
Figure 7.2 Share initialization during the bootstrapping phase. The dealer provides each
of the initial nodes with their share.
the dealer is the only entity that has access to the certificate-signing key CAsk  and he/she
can therefore issue the initial certificates mentioned above [2].
To initialize the first k nodes of the network the following steps are performed:
1. The dealer generates the sharing polynomial 
f (x) = 0a + 1a x+…+ 1ka 1kx             (7.1)
over ZN where 0a = CASK .  
3. Each of the initial k nodes, identified by iid , i = 1…k are securely supplied with their
polynomial share 
iS  = f ( iid ) modN.            (7.2)
3. The dealer broadcasts  k  public witnesses of the sharing polynomial’s coefficients {
0ag … 1kag } after which it destroys the polynomial and quits.
4. Each node verifies that it received a valid share in step 2 above by checking 
iSg  = 0ag . iidag )( 1 … 11 )(  kik idag                                                (7.3)
After  the  bootstrapping  of  the  first  k  nodes,  the  dealer  is  only  responsible  for  the
registration, initialization and initial certification of any new nodes joining the network
[2].
7.2.2 Share Initialization
Any new nodes joining the network are incorporated into the distributed CA by being
provided with their own share of the CA certificate-signing key CAsk . Since the dealer is
no longer part of the network this share distribution mechanism needs to be handled by
the nodes that have already been initialized as illustrated in Figure 7.3.
Figure 7.3 Share initialization during operational phase, due to joining node. Those
nodes are already part of the CA service, which generate a new share from their shares
and initialize the new node.
A node i  already initialized can generate a partial share ipS , = iS . iidI ( pid ) for the joining
node p,  iidI (x) is the Lagrange term. By combining k such partial shares the complete
share pS for the joining node can be generated as following
pS = 
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 = f ( pid ) mod N                                                   (7.4)
However the joining node can only be allowed to know the value of the sum of the k sub
shares, not the value of the sub shares themselves. The reason for this is that iidI ( pid ) is
a publicly known value and therefore the iS  can be derived, thereby revealing the secret
shares of the nodes in the coalition [2].
To protect  the  secrecy of the coalition  nodes’  secret  shares,  they shuffle their  partial
shares before sending them to the joining node. Figure 7.4 illustrates how the shuffling
scheme works in the case where the coalition consists of two nodes, node 1 and node 2.
First node 1 and 2 secretly agree on a random shuffling factor 2,1d where one of the nodes
treats it as a positive number and the other node treats it as a negative number. The two
nodes then add the shuffling factor to their respective sub shares and send the resulting
shuffled sub shares to the joining node 3. Node 3 then adds up the shuffled sub shares
resulting in its complete share 3S .  In the case that  k  is larger than 2, i.e. the coalition
consists  of more than 2 nodes,  each pair  of nodes { i , j } in the coalition agree on a
shuffling factor jid , . Therefore the numbers of shuffling factors that need to be distributed
are k (k-1)/2, where k is the size of the coalition.
Figure 7.4 Complete shuffling scheme.
Below is a step by step description of the share initialization described above, where node
p is the node that wishes to be initialized:
1. Node p locates a coalition B of k nodes, B = { 1id ... kid } and broadcasts an initialization
request.
2.  Each node in the coalition verifies the certificate of node p,  pcert  and checks that it
hasn’t been revoked. If the verification fails the request is denied.
3. Each pair of nodes { i , j } in the coalition now need to agree on a shuffling factor jid , .
One of the nodes generates the shuffling factor and encrypts it with the public key of the
other node and signs it. It also generates and signs a public witness jikdg of the shuffling
factor. The witness is needed to be able to detect and identify any misbehaving coalition
nodes  that  generate  an  invalid  shuffled  partial  share.  The  shuffling  factors  and  their
witnesses are then sent to the requesting node p. 
4. Node p distributes the shuffling factors and the witnesses received to all the coalition
nodes.
5. Each coalition node j now generates the partial share ipS  = jS . jidI )( pid  for node p and
shuffles it using the shuffling factors received in the previous step. The shuffled partial
share ipS  is generated as follows: 
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 6. Each coalition node j sends its shuffled partial share ipS  to node p.
7. Node p verifies each of the received shuffled partial shares ipS  by checking that
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If  the  verification  fails  node  p  drops  the  invalid  shuffled  share  and  issues  a  new
initialization  request  from a  new coalition  excluding  the  misbehaving  node  that  was
detected. Node p also revokes the misbehaving nodes certificate and floods an accusation
against it. 
8. If all the shuffled partial shares where correct,  node  p  can obtain its new share by
adding the shuffled partial shares 
PS = 
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 mod N                                    (7.7)
After  being initialized  with  its  share of  the  certificate  signing key  CAsk the  node has
become part of the CA and can participate in the provision of the CA’s service, including
certificate  renewal  and revocation as well  as  initializing any joining nodes  with their
share of the certificate-signing key CAsk  [23].
7.2.3 Share Update
Proactive secret sharing is required to protect against attackers that (given enough time)
can compromise k or more nodes and thereby be able to reconstruct the shared secret, in
this case the certificate-signing key CAsk . As illustrated in Figure 7.5 the lifetime of the
network is divided up in time periods, where each time period consists of two phases, the
operational phase and the share update phase. During the operational phase nodes can
renew their certificate and request share initialization. During the share update phase all
nodes that have been initialized update their shares in a distributed manner.
During the share update phase the following three steps are performed:
 Collaborative generation of the update polynomial updatef (x).
 Distribution of the update polynomial to all network nodes.
 Distributed evaluation of the share update )( pupdatep idfS   of all nodes p.
Figure 7.5 show different phases during the lifetime of the Ad hoc Network.
At the beginning of the share update phase each node initiates the update process with the
probability  n/1  where  nˆ  is  a  known  estimate  of  the  total  number  of  nodes  in  the
network. The node that decides to initiate the share update then locates a coalition of k
nodes that generate the update polynomial  )(xfupdate  =  1221 ....
 kk xbxbxb  mod N.
Each  of  the  polynomial’s  coefficients  is  then  encrypted,  signed,  and  flooded  in  the
network. At this point every node in the network has received { )( 1bE CApk …6 )( 1kpk bE CA },
which it has authenticated by verifying the signatures. This prevents an attacker from
being able  to  flood a  false  update  polynomial.  Each node  p  in  the network can now
generate its update share )( pupdatep idfS  ; however since the polynomial is encrypted it
must request the evaluation of its update share from a coalition of k nodes. Each of the
nodes in the coalition returns a partial update share to the requesting node  p  that adds
them to  obtain  its  complete  update  share pS .  Adding  this  update  share  to  the  nodes
current share provides the updated share of CAsk  [23].
During the share update phase two different versions of shares can be present since not all
nodes update their shares simultaneously. However, as long as the nodes in the coalition
use the same version of their shares, the services required can be performed. Therefore
the nodes keep the old share until the share update phase is complete. At this point they
destroy the old share and thereafter only use the updated share until the next share update
phase [22].
7.3 Certificate Issuing
This solution is based on the assumption that all nodes have been initialized, registered,
and issued a valid certificate  before they join the network. The distributed CA never
issues new certificates; it only manages certificates once they have been initially created.
The responsibility of initializing,  registering, and certifying new nodes belongs to the
administrative authority responsible for setting up the network, i.e. the dealer [22].
7.4 Certificate Renewal
Since certificates are only valid for a limited time period they must be renewed  before
they expire. When a node  p  wishes to renew its certificate  cert  it requests a certificate
renewal from a coalition of k of its one-hop neighbors. Each node i  in the coalition first
checks if the old certificate has not already been expired and that it as not been revoked.
If they agree to serve the request they each generate a new partial certificate  icert  and
return it to the requesting node p. Node p then combines the k partial certificates to obtain
its updated certificate updatecert . The details of this process are described below:
1. Node p, that wishes to update its certificate, broadcasts a certificate renewal request to
its one-hop neighborhood, see Figure 7.6.
2.  Each of the nodes that receive the request,  check that the requesting nodes current
certificate  cert  has not expired or been revoked. If the certificate is still  valid and the
receiving node i  decides to serve the request it generates the partial certificate icert  by
using its share of CA’s certificate signing key CAsk . The partial certificate is generated as
follows; icert  = iScert)(  modN where iS  is node i ’s sub share of CAsk .
Figure 7.6 Node requesting for certificate renewal.
4. Each node  i  serving the request randomly generate a  u  and calculate  ugA 1  and
ucertA 2 . It then calculates 
c = Hash ( 21 ,,, AAcertg i
Si )                                                                                    (7.8)
r = u-c. iS .           (7.9)
The values 21 , AA , r are used to enable the verification of the generated partial certificate
ptcer   
4. Each node i  returns icert , A1, A2, r to the requesting node p.
5. Node p now chooses k of the partial certificates received and verifies each of them by
checking that  Agg cSr i ).(  and that 2).( Acertcert
c
i
r  . Node p can generate  c  by
applying the same hash function used in step 3 above. 21 , AA , r are known from step 4
and  
iSg  = 0ag  . iidag )( 1 … 11 )(


k
ik idag                                                                   (7.10)
can be calculated using the public witnesses of the sharing polynomial’s coefficients. 
6.  If any of the partial certificates failed the verification, the certificate of the node that
generated the invalid certificate is revoked.
A different partial certificate is then chosen from those received in step 4 and validated as
described in step 5. If less than  k  valid certificates are received the certificate renewal
fails.
7.  Node  p  combines  the  k  valid  partial  certificates  to  obtain  a  candidate  certificate

updatedcert .

updatedcert  = )0()( iidIBi icertÎ   
  = )( )0(ÎBi iidi IScert
= CAskNtcert .)(                                                  (7.11)
8. The updated certificate should be 
CAsk
updated certcert   [23].                                                         (7.12)
7.5 Certificate Revocation
The certificate revocation mechanism is based on the assumption that all nodes monitor
the behavior of their  one-hop neighbors and maintain their  own certificate revocation
lists. If a node discovers that one of its neighbors is misbehaving it adds its certificate to
the  CRL  and  floods  an  accusation  against  the  node.  Any  node  receiving  such  an
accusation first checks its CRL to verify that the accusation didn’t originate from a node
whose  certificate  has  been  revoked.  If  the  accuser’s  certificate  has  been revoked the
accusation  is  ignored.  However,  if  the  accusation  originated  from  a  valid  node,  the
accused node is  marked as suspect.  When thresholds  of legitimate  accusations,  i.e.  k
accusations, against the same node are received the accused node’s certificate is revoked
[21].
Figure  7.7  illustrates  the  sequence  of  events  when  two  nodes  B  andC detect  a
misbehaving node D ,  first  nodes  B  and  C  revoke node D ’s certificate and thereafter
they flood an accusation. Upon receiving the accusations, node A  first validates them by
checking its  own CRL to make sure that  the certificate of node  B or  C  hasn’t  been
revoked. Since a threshold of accusation has been received (in this example k = 2) node
A  also adds node D  to its CRL. Node A  then retransmits the accusations of node B  and
C . Node E and F receiving these accusations then perform the same steps as node A .
 Figure 7.7 Certificate revocation and distributed maintenance of certificate revocation
lists.
8. THE PROPOSED ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we present our overall architecture that provides ubiquitous, scalable and
robust authentication services, specifically the certification services for mobile users in
Ad hoc wireless networks. Our design employs the asymmetric cryptographic primitives,
specifically standard RSA. We take the certificate based authentication mechanisms.
8.1 Design Rational
In this section we will  explain design issues of proposed architecture, distributed key
management system.
8.1.1 Certification Services
As  identified,  certification  services  include  issuing/renewing  certificates,  revoking
certificate, storing and retrieving certificates and certificate revocation lists (CRL). Each
certificate  is  stamped  with  an  expiration  time.  Nodes  have  to  renew and  get  a  new
certificate  before  expiration.  Certificates  may  become  invalid  before  expiration.  The
revocation service has to put such information on the revoked certificates into CRL’s for
queries from nodes [5].
The focus of this report is to provide ubiquitous certification services to mobile nodes in
an Ad hoc wireless network.
8.1.2 Certificate-Based Approach
There are five basic aspects  that  characterize a secure communication:  Data integrity,
which ensures that only authorized parties are able to modify transmitted information.
Authentication is a mechanism, which the sender of a message can be correctly identified.
Message confidentiality, which ensures that transmitted data is accessible only for reading
by, authorized entities. Non-repudiation requires that neither the sender, nor the receiver
of a message be able to deny the transmission and Service availability, which demands
that computer system assets be available to authorized entities when needed [5].
Certificate-based approaches readily provide workable solutions to the first four of the
above-mentioned functions. We seek to solve the problem of service availability through
the  design  of  the  ubiquitous  certification  protocols,  specifically  for  mobile  Ad  hoc
networks. 
8.1.2.1 Authentication via Certificates
Authentication in the RSA context relies on two factors. For node iv to authenticate itself
to another node, it has to prove its knowledge of the private key isk  and the association
between itself and the advertised public key ipk .  A challenge/response protocol can be
followed  to  prove  the  knowledge  of  the  private  key isk .  A  certificate  proves  the
association.
Generally a certificate iCERT is a statement icert that is signed by some trusted authority's
private key SK. The statement icert may read: “It is certified that the personal public key
of node iv  until time t is ipk ". In RSA, iCERT  = SKicert )( . The certificate does not need
to be private. It is actually made public by some directory service or being carried by node
iv . The authority's public key PK is assumed to be well known to every node so each
node can verify the validity of iv ’s certificate iCERT  by applying PK to check if icert = (
iCERT ) PK.  A valid certificate proves the association between node iv  and its public key
ipk  [5].
8.1.2 Threshold Secret Sharing
Threshold  secret  sharing exhibits  several  desirable  properties  that  fit  well  in  Ad hoc
networks: 
(a)  A key feature of Ad hoc networks is lack of centralized control.  Distributing and
sharing the control are consistent to the nature of Ad hoc networks. 
(b) Ubiquitous services are enabled once the secret is fully distributed to each locality.
Besides, intrusion detection is more practical and efficient if localized. 
(c)  The  threshold  K  is  the  balance  point  between  service  availability  and  intrusion
tolerance. An adversary group must destroy  partial  shares (N-K+1) holders to turn off
certification services, whereas it  must break in at least K shareholders to steal SK the
system secret. We next compare our choice of threshold with two extreme cases in the
entire solution space:
“1 out of N” scheme: the centralized solution is actually a special case of the threshold
secret sharing. The threshold K=1 results in vulnerable security since SK is held by a
single entity. The centralized server suffers from a single point of service denial and a
single point of compromise. In the former case, no service can be provided to network
entities.  In the latter  case,  the system secret  SK is  revealed and the  entire  system is
compromised [5].
“N out  of  N” scheme: The  threshold  results  in  maximal  security but  minimal  fault
tolerance. Unless the adversary breaks into every entity in the system, it cannot  expose
SK. However, since all N entities are   required in providing the service, the system secret
is  lost  once  system failure  occurs  at  any single  entity. Besides,  this  approach is  not
scalable in a large network [5].
Therefore,  our  threshold  security  design  seeks  to  provide  flexible  tradeoffs  among
security, availability, intrusion tolerance, and fault tolerance. By choosing 1< K < N
1we avoid both the” single point of compromise” and the” single point of failure/DoS
attack” problems.  Though a certain number  of entities  may be intruded or faulty, the
system secret SK  is not exposed or lost.
8.1.3 Polynomial Secret Sharing
Our design makes extensive use of the polynomial secret sharing due to Shamir. A secret,
specifically the certificate-signing key SK , is shared among all n nodes in the network. To
distribute SK , a random coefficients polynomial of order k –1 is generated:
f (x) = a0+a1x+a2x2+...+ak-1xk-1                                                                                                                       (8.1)
Node  iv  gets its share P iv = f ( iv ) privately.  Any coalition of k nodes can potentially
recover SK by Lagrange interpolation:
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No coalition up to k-1 nodes yields any information about SK. This mechanism is robust
against the attacks of the adversaries.
8.1.4 Secret Share Updates
In threshold secret sharing, adversaries need to compromise at least K  entities to expose
the  system secret SK .  However,  they have  the  entire  system lifetime  to  mount  these
attacks. Gradual break-ins into K entities over a long period of time may be possible and
therefore long-lived secret sharing is not sufficient. A naive make-up is to periodically
change SK  itself.  [5]
However, in a wireless Ad hoc network without centralized control, it is an open issue
who has the authority to annul the current SK  and enforce the change. This motivates our
design choice to periodically update the shares instead of the SK  itself. Further defend
the  privacy  of  the  shared  SK  against  the  adversaries’  there  are  a  lot  of  candidate
polynomials that can be applied to share  SK  in the polynomial secret sharing context.
The  mechanism  is  based  on  periodically  updating  the  secret  shares  with  different
polynomials.  We apply this technique with scalable algorithms to further improve the
robustness against adversaries.
8.1.5 Certificate Revocation
In an Ad hoc network there may be some misbehaving nodes. Defend the network against
adversaries  we use  a  certificate  revocation mechanism.  In this  revocation  mechanism
misbehaving  nodes  that  are  accused  by  some  other  nodes  are  added  to  certificate
revocation list. When a node id is in certificate revocation list this node is not trusted and
treated as an adversaries.
8.2 Primitives
At  the bootstrapping phase of the network, a dealer has to send each networking node
privately its share of the SK , according to a polynomial of order k -1. We denote this
process  the  “initialization"  of  nodes.  A large  Ad  hoc  wireless  network  may contain
hundreds  or  even  thousands  of  networking  nodes.  Relying  on  the  dealer  for  the
initialization, as most works in threshold secret sharing do, is not scalable and may not be
feasible. Moreover, new nodes may join over the lifetime of the network. Maintaining a
dealer  on  line  to  handle  future  node  joins  would  compromise  the  overall  system
robustness and security. The dealer would become the single point of failure and inviting
target of DoS attacks. Since the dealer is  the only entity that  holds the complete SK ,
maintaining a dealer on line also increases the adversaries'  chance to compromise the
dealer and therefore SK , thus effectively turns down the whole services. We address these
issues  by  a  scalable  initialization  mechanism  called  “self-initialization".  In  our
architecture, the dealer is only responsible to initialize the very first k nodes, no matter
how large the network would be.  The initialized nodes collaboratively initialize other
nodes,  typically  their  neighboring  nodes.  Repeating  this  procedure,  the  network
progressively “self-initializes" itself.
In our  architecture,  each networking node  i with  nonzero  ID  iv  is  associated  with  a
personal  RSA key pair  <  isk ;  ipk >  isk denotes  svi '  private key for  decryption and
signing ipk  denotes svi ' public key for encryption and verification. The private key isk
is only possessed by node iv  for two typical usages. One is for iv  to decrypt messages
that are encrypted by the corresponding public key ipk . The other is for node iv  to sign
some messages or statements to generate a signature. The public key ipk  is advertised to
other nodes. It is used for other nodes to encrypt messages toward iv , and to verify a
signature that is supposedly signed by node iv  with its private key isk . 
In  our  architecture,  each  node  carries  a  certificate  signed  by  SK  (Secret  Key).  The
corresponding PK (Public Key) is to be well known to each node in the network, so that
certificates are globally verifiable. Nodes without valid certificates will be isolated, that
is,  the  network  will  not  forward  their  packets.  Essentially these  nodes without  valid
certificates  are  treated  the  same  as  adversaries.  They are  denied  from access  to  any
network  resources.  When  a  mobile  node  moves  to  a  new  location,  it  exchanges
certificates with its new neighbors and goes through mutual authentication processes to
build trust relationships. Neighboring nodes with such trust relationship help each other
forward and route packets.
Each certificate is stamped with an expiration time. Nodes have to renew and be issued a
new certificate upon the expiration of its old certificate. In the centralized authentication
architecture, nodes have to contact a CA server for this service. In our architecture, we
distribute  the  private  key  SK  that  is  used  to  sign  certificates  into  each  node  of  the
network by a  polynomial  of  order  k  -  1.  A node  iv  with its  expiring old  certificate
requests  a new certificate  from any coalition  of k nodes, typically among its one-hop
neighbors. A neighboring node checks its record on iv  that requests certification services.
If its record shows iv  a well-behaving legitimate node, it returns a “partial" certificate by
applying  its  share  of SK .  Otherwise  the  request  is  dropped.  By  collecting  k  partial
certificates,  iv  combines them together to generate the full  new certificate as if it were
from a CA server. A misbehaving or broken node that is detected by its neighbors will be
unable to get a new certificate. It will be cut out from the network at the expiration of its
current certificate. Moreover, we propose explicit certificate revocation and distributed
CRL storage/retrieval  mechanisms to deal  with the scenario when a  node is  detected
misbehaving or broken well before its current certificate's expiration time.
By distributing  the  certification  services  into  each  node's  one-hop  neighborhood,  we
realize  ubiquitous  service  availability  for  mobile  nodes  and  robustness  against  DoS
attacks.  The  communication  is  localized  into  one-hop  range,  which  minimizes  the
exposure to wireless channel errors.
8.3 Algorithm
We  adopt  the  polynomial  secret  sharing  to  share  SK  among  the  network.  In  our
algorithms,  node iv 's  polynomial  share  P iv and its  additive  share  SK iv  in  term of  a
specific coalition are defined over the ring ZN. After the initialization of the network, each
node with its ID iv  holds a polynomial share
Detailed algorithms are as follows:
Secret Sharing:
 f (x) = a0+a1x+a2x2+...+ak-1xk-1                                                                                                                     (8.3)
Node  iv  gets its share P iv = f ( iv ) privately.  Any coalition of k nodes can potentially
recover SK by Lagrange interpolation defined as in (8.2)
P iv  = f ( iv ) mod N, where f (x) = SK  + xf1  +..... +
1
1


k
k xf  is the secret polynomial.
Since the certificate verification key PK is to be well known, N is also well known as part
of PK. Only the ID’s and shares of the participating k nodes are involved.
Partial signature Generation: Node iv  generates a partial signature with his/her partial
private key ivSK  viCERT . cert  is a new nodes certificate request.
viCERT  = viSKcert)( modN           (8.4)
Combining Partial Certificates: Node  iv  sends  viCERT  to the requesting node jv .
Upon receiving k partial certificates { 1vCERT , 2vCERT ,…, vkCERT } from the coalition B,
node  iv  combines them together by multiplication to generate a “candidate certificate"
CERT’.
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 Inputs: CERT’ the candidate certificate 
Cert: statement of the certificate, to be signed
Output: CERT: Certificate
1: Z := (cert)-N mod N
2: j: = 0, Y: = 1
3: while j < k do
4: Y: = Y. Z mod N, j: = j + 1
5: if (cert = Y PK mod N) then
6: break while
7: end if
8: end while
9: output Y = CERT
As long as k neighbors respond with partial certificates, other neighbors are free to move
or fail, additional response messages may be lost. A neighboring node can move away
freely after sending back the partial certificate.
Proactive Secret Share Update:  Given n servers, Let ( 1s , 2s … ns ) be a ),( kn sharing of
the private key S of the service, with server i  having is . Assuming all servers are correct,
share refreshing proceeds as follows first, each server randomly generates 1is , 2is …. ins  is
a  ),( kn  sharing of 0. We call these newly generated ijs ’s sub shares. Then, every sub
share ijs  is distributed to server j through a secure link. When server j gets the sub shares
js1 , js2 ... njs  it can compute a new share from these sub shares and its old share 
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The  above  operations  require  minimum  requirements  on  the  reliability  of  wireless
communications.
8.4 Implementation
In this section we will explain details of implementation.
8.4.1 Self Initialization
Each well-behaving, certificate-holding entity xv  can also obtain a secret share xvP , which
is used to derive xSK , in providing certification services. We have devised a localized
self-initialization algorithm to compute secret shares given an un-initialized entity xv  a
local coalition of K shareholders, { ),()2,()1,( ,...,, kxxx vvv } can compute its secret share
xv
P   Can compute its secret share:
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Each coalition member ),( ixv computes a partial secret share ),( jxSS  from its secret share
),( ixP  then returns the partial secret share to the requester. The requester’s secret share is
the sum of the partial secret shares.
As Lagrange coefficients are publicly known,  xv can derive  ),( jxvP  by knowing  ),( jxSS
directly. To keep ),( jxvP  as a secret only to its owner ),( ixv , we employ a complete shuffling
scheme. In the complete shuffling scheme, a random between any two members in the
coalition is generated. The entity with larger ID treats the nonce as a positive number
while the other side treats it as a negative number. Each member totally has K-1 such
nonces. Before ),( ixv  sends back the partial secret share, it sums the K-1 nonces and ),( jxSS
, then sends a shuffled partial secret share to xv . It is easy to verify that  xv  obtains the
same value xvP nonce is exchanged.
Protocol requires four steps
1.  The  un-initialized  node  broadcasts  the  service  request,  along  with  local  coalition
information.
2. Each coalition member selects a random nonce for other members if its ID is lower
than the other one. Each nonce is encrypted with the personal < pk  > of the intended
receiver. The requester acts as the router and accepts all  shuffling packages from K-1
members (The member with the highest ID needs not select nonces).
3. The requester routes encrypted nonce’s to intended receivers.
4. Each member decrypts all nonce’s, computes a shuffled partial secret share, and then
sends it back to xv .
8.4.2 Issuing of Certificates
A new certificate request is sent by a client who wants to obtain a new certificate on a
public key is controls (it generates and stores). 
Before client begin protocol is must  be authenticated. First new node send a message
includes modN which is used to authenticate user. After authentication new node, nodes
send a message including threshold K value.
To start issuing a new certificate client sends the message (issue-request, cid, key, name
(IP...),), and waits for response. Key is signature or encryption key.
Figure 8.1 Certificate Request
Client will retrieve messages (issue-reply,cid,s) . After decrypting new node sends reply
to  threshold  node  broadcast  answer  (issue-answer,cid,d)  decrypted.  After  verified
decrypted value is same as value send nodes send sub share of new node encrypted with
new nodes.
8.4.3 Distributing Own Public Key
After initialize phase new node send its certificate to all neighbors, if a node receiving a
certificate may decide to store it or may discard it. If it store this new arriving certificate,
it  send  certificate  to  the  node  that  wants  this  certificate.  This  model  also  provides
distributed certification service.
8.4.5 Giving Sub Share to New Arrival Node
After certification phase node must be initialized as a server node to give certification
service.  So it  needs a sub share of CA private key SK .  According to proactive share
refreshing algorithm all  nodes generate a value from their  sub shares,  which must  be
sending to the new arrival node in a secure way. It is encrypted nodes public key in my
protocol. So only new node can decrypt these values and after combining all values it
obtains its own sub share. This also provides update of all sub shares of nodes in Ad hoc
network.
A  local  coalition  of  K  shareholders,  can  compute  its  secret  share  vxP by  Lagrange
interpolation:
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Each coalition member ),( jxv computes a partial secret share ),( jxSS  from its secret share
vP  then returns the partial secret share to the requester. The requester’s sub share is the
sum of K partial secret share.
8.5.6 Node Leave
Node may send node leave message or it  may be decided by the nodes that  node is
unreachable. In that state the certificate of the node must be revoked. 
If threshold value K is in critical it must be updated.
8.5.7 Key Update
To further enhance the robustness of our design, we periodically update all  the secret
shares  to  invalidate  compromised secret  shares.  In the  bootstrapping phase  all  secret
shares are tagged with version number 1 and ID. Each secret share update will increase
the version by 1, and there is a predefined minimal lapse time between two consecutive
updates. During the update transition period, secret shareholders with the same version
tag can collaboratively function as the CA 
We employ the proactive secret  share update  algorithms to  create a community of K
entities  with  new  version  of  secret  shares.  Then  the  self-initialization  protocol  is
employed to propagate the new version over the entire  network.  If there are multiple
proactive  updates  concurrently going on,  then we may have  version  conflicts.  In our
solution is to include the lowest ID of the original updated entities into the version tag.
The version tag with the lowest ID wins in the case of version conflicts.
8.5.8 Certificate Revocation Scheme
The first duty of a node after entering a network is to broadcast its certificate to all the
nodes, and simultaneously sends a request that the nodes send their profile tables. The
profile table contains information about the behavior profile of each node in a network.
The  information  in  the  profile  tables  is  used  to  determine  whether  or  not  a  given
certificate should be revoked. Each node is required to compile and maintain a profile
table.  A  profile  table  can  be  represented  in  the  form  of  a  packet  of  varied  length
depending on the number. It should be noted that a node is allowed to accuse a given
node only once throughout the lifetime of a certificate. Therefore, when an accusation is
broadcast, the nodes are required to check the data in their profile tables, and add the
information regarding the new accusation (certificate serial number of the accuser and the
node being accused, and the date), only if there is no prior record of the of accusation
launched against the nodes.
Details of the fields and content of the profile table are as follows:
1-Owner’s ID: This field is the first 32 bits of the profile table.
It contains an integer indicating the serial number of the owner’s (the node that compiled
the profile table) digital certificate.
2.  Node count:  this is  a 16-bit  field containing a short  integer indicating the owner’s
perspective regarding the current number (N) of nodes the network. 
3. Peer ID:  This is a 32-bit field containing the certificate serial number of a node that is
accused of misbehavior. This field also serves the purpose of a marker: if it contains zero,
it indicates the end of the profile table.
4. Certificate status: This field contains a 1-bit flag; it is set if the certificate of peer i is
revoked and unset otherwise.
5.  Accusation info: This is a 64-bit field; the first 32 bits contains an integer indicating
the certificate serial number of a node that accused peer i of misbehavior. The remaining
32 bits contains the date that the accusation was made.
If field 3 does not contain zero, the profile table continues with the certificate status and
accusation info fields; and if there are more than one accuser, it  continues with 97-bit
blocks containing information about other accusers.
Figure 8.2 Fields of status table
The information regarding the number of accusations, the identity of the accusers, the
nodes being accused and the date the accusation was made, should be consistent in all the
profile tables. If the node requesting the profile tables, notices any inconsistency, it is
expected  to  launch  an  accusation  against  the  node(s)  that  sent  the  inconsistent  data.
Profile table data is assumed to be inconsistent if it differs from the data contained in the
majority of the other profile tables. Finally, the node compiles its own profile table based
on the data the majority of the profile tables contain.
It should be noted that a node is allowed to accuse a given node only once throughout the
lifetime  of  a  certificate.  Therefore,  when  an  accusation  is  broadcast,  the  nodes  are
required to check the data in their profile tables, and add the information regarding the
new accusation (certificate serial number of the accuser and the node being accused, and
the date), only if there is no prior record of the accuser accusing that particular node.
8.5.8.1 Stipulation for Certificate Revocation
In addition to a profile table and a certificate repository, each node is required to compile
and maintain a status table. Initially, it is compiled from the data in the profile table, and
updated  simultaneously  along  with  the  latter  when  a  new,  pertinent  accusation  is
received. The status table is used to ascertain the status of a certificate; it consists of the
following info:
Number of accusations against node i  ( iA ): The total number of accusations- limited to
one per node made against node i .
Number of accusation made by node i :( i ) the total number of accusation limited to one
per node made by node i -1
Behavior index of node i ( i ): The behavior index of a node i i  is a number such that
0< i ≤1 It is a measure of the status of the node amongst its peers. The greater the value
of i the higher the status of the given node i i  is computed as follows:
i  =1-λ iA                                                                                                              (8.9)
where λ = 1/2N-3 N is the node count.
Weight  of  node  i  accusation  ( i ):  The  weight  of  a  node  accusation  or  potential
accusation. It depends on the behavior index and the number of accusations it made. 
i  = i -λ i          (8.10) 
where λ = 1/2N-3
Revocation quotient ( jR ): This number determines whether or not the certificate for node
j should be revoked. It is computed as follows:
jR  = i
N
i
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The revocation quotient threshold RT is configurable parameter. Its value depends on the
sensitivity of the security requirement. Typically tR  maybe N/2 where N is the number of
nodes in network If jR > tR certificate of node j is revoked [26].
9. EVALUATION OF IMPLEMENTATION
In this section we will briefly explain simulation and simulation environment.
9.1 Simulation
In this section we describe our architecture for ubiquitous security services in wireless Ad
hoc networks. From the cryptographic perspective, our design is based on the concepts of
threshold secret sharing and secret share updates.
From the system aspect, the architecture is fully distributed and localized.
9.1.1 Simulation Environment
-Programming Language: JAVA (Java Development Kit 1.4.0)
-Development Environment (IDE): Eclipse
-Development Platform: Windows
-Libraries Used: Java Crypto Environment (JCE), GNU Crypto
9.1.2 Features
There is a configuration file used in Distributed Key Management System simulation.
This configuration file contains some initialization parameter, such as, node number in
the network, threshold value etc.
The config.conf file:
1. Configuration
a. Threshold Value
b. Node Count
c. Certificate Validity Period
d. Key Length
2. Node
a. Range
b. Coordinate Constraint
c. Password Phase
9.1.3 Bootstrapping
In bootstrapping phase the network constructed according to configuration parameters;
Node count, threshold value, key length etc.
In  simulation  one  Ad  hoc  network  simulated.  That  network  has  some  nodes  and  a
public/private key pairs (< PK ; SK >). Also all nodes have their own public/private key
pairs.
Simulated Ad hoc network’s private/public key pair is generated according to key length
read  from  configuration  file.  Then  a  random  coefficient  polynomial  is  constructed.
Polynomial f (x) of degree k -1, then any members of the community can recover the
secret  via  Lagrange interpolation,  while  any less  than  K members  of  the  community
reveal no information of the secret. This coefficient’s of polynomial is randomly selected
between of 1-10.
Generated Public Key ( PK ) is converted to certificate structure by signing with private
key SK . This network’s certificate is distributed all off the nodes in Ad hoc network.
RSA secret key SK  { nd , } generated and randomly selected a polynomial 
f (x) = SK +a1x+a2x2+...+ak-1xk-1  ,such that the shared f (0) is SK . Each entity 
iv ( i  =1,  2,  3....  N)  (N:  Number  of  nodes  in  network)  holds  a  secret  share
)mod)(( NvfP ivi  .
Each networking node i  with nonzero ID iv is associated with a personal RSA key pair
< isk ;  ipk  >.  isk Denotes  svi '  private key for decryption and signing, ipk denotes iv 's
public key for encryption and verification. The private key isk  is only possessed by node
iv for two typical usages. One is for  iv  to decrypt messages that are encrypted by the
corresponding  public  key ipk .  The  other  is  for  node  iv to  sign  some  messages  or
statements to generate a signature. The public key ipk  is advertised to other nodes. It is
used  for  other  nodes  to  encrypt  messages  toward iv  and  to  verify a  signature  that  is
supposedly  signed  by  node iv with  its  private.  Nodes  ipk  is  converted  to  certificate
structure and signed with Ad hoc network signing key SK , and then all the nodes in the
network  can  verify  each  other’s  certificate. Nodes without  valid  certificates  will  be
isolated,  that  is,  the  network  will  not  forward  their  packets.  Essentially  these  nodes
without valid certificates are treated the same as adversaries. They are denied from access
to any network resources. 
9.1.4 Packages
In our simulation we used package hierarchy 
a. tr.edu.itu.adhoc 
b. tr.edu.itu.adhoc.certificate
c. tr.edu.itu.adhoc.crypto
d. tr.edu.itu.adhoc.gui
e. tr.edu.itu.adhoc.messages
f. tr.edu.itu.adhoc.network
g. tr.edu.itu.adhoc.simulation
h. tr.edu.itu.adhoc.store
i. tr.edu.itu.adhoc.utils
9.1.5 Classes
In this section we give some details about classes that we used in simulation.
9.1.5.1 Package: tr.edu.itu.adhoc.certificate
In  this  section  we  give  all  classes  and  some  details  about  these  classes  in
tr.edu.itu.adhoc.certificate package.
NodeCertificate: This is a class that is used to represent each nodes certificate data type.
Each node has an object in the type of NodeCertificate.
CertificateRevocationList: This is a class that is used to represent certificate revocation
list  in  the  Ad  hoc  network.  Each  node  verifies  other  client’s  certificate  with
CertificateRevocationList.  In  the  system  there  is  only  one  instance  of
CertificateRevocationList  object.  Each  node  searches  for  fresh  copy  of
CertificateRevocationList and stores it in its local store.
BlackList:  This  is  a  class  that  is  used  to  store  node  accusations.  If a  node accurate
another  node  this  accusation  is  not  directly accepted  and  the  node  certificate  is  not
revoked .In our system it is put into a blacklist. This instance of BlackList object must be
synchronized and this done in our system with a protocol.
9.1.5.2 Package: tr.edu.itu.adhoc.crypto
In  this  section  we  give  all  classes  and  some  details  about  these  classes  in
tr.edu.itu.adhoc.crypto package.
Crypto:  This class is used for all cryptographic functions. One of them is to generate
keys according to the given algorithm and key length. Another one is for encrypting given
data with a given public key and also there is another function used for decryption of an
encrypted data. Also there is a function that is used for verifying signature.
CyptoUtils:  This  class  is  used  as  a  utility object.  There  are  some constants  used  in
simulation.
MyLagrange: This class is used in LaGrange operations.
9.1.5.3 Package: tr.edu.itu.adhoc.gui
In  this  section  we  give  all  classes  and  some  details  about  these  classes  in
tr.edu.itu.adhoc.gui package.
DrawNode:  This class is  used for displaying a node and its all details.  For example,
nodes location, nodes neighbors, nodes certificate.
DrawPath:  This  class  is  used  to  find  a  path  between  to  node.  In  this  class  dijsktra
algorithm is used for path finding. Also in this class the path between nodes are drawn in
a frame.
LinkOutputToTextArea: This class is used for debugging. All the system messages are
written into a text area. Also this class is used to give some messages to the user.
SimulationComponent: This class is the main class of the simulation. The project is run
from this class and generates management interface.
9.1.5.4 Package: tr.edu.itu.adhoc.messages
In  this  section  we  give  all  classes  and  some  details  about  these  classes  in
tr.edu.itu.adhoc.messages package.
Message:  This class provides an interface to all other message classes. In this class we
defined all methods and properties that a message object should have.
AuthenticationMessage: This message class implements Message interface. In order to
use this class, destination node and data should be set. This class is used for new joining
nodes to authenticate themselves to the network. This message is send all the neighboring
nodes.  To  verify  the  message  integrity  also  messageMAC  control  is  added.  In  this
message source node shows the node that wants to join in to the adhoc network.
AuthenticationFailMessage:  This  message  class  implements  Message  interface.  The
joining node sends its neighbors AuthenticationMessage and put a data in to this message,
if  the data is  incorrect  authentication fails  and nodes received AuthenticationMessage
sends back AuthenticationFailMessage.
AuthenticationSuccess: This message class implements Message interface. The joining
node send its neighbors AuthenticationMessage and put a data in to this message, if the
data is  correct  authentication is  succeeded and nodes received AuthenticationMessage
sends back AuthenticationSuccessMessage.
CertificateAccusationMessage: This message class implements Message interface. This
class  is  used  when  a  nodes  suspicious  from  another  node.  This  node  sends
CertificateAccusationMessage to all nodes in its range. In this message node sets accused
nodes id and reason of accusation.
CertificateAccusationResponseMessage:  This  message  class  implements  Message
interface.  This  type  of  message  is  sent  when  node  receives  a  message  in  type
CertificateAccusationMessage. First it checks its black list if same node accused by the
same node and also checks certificate status from certificate revocation list.  Then this
node calculates accusation rate of accusatory and suspicious node. Then node and this
information to its blacklist and send it over all network.
CertificateRetriavalMessage:  This message class implements Message interface. This
type of message is sent when node wants to receive some other node certificate. Source
and requesting node ids are set before sending this message to all over the network.
CertificateRetriavalRespMessage:  This message class implements Message interface.
This  type  of  message  is  sent  when  node  receives  a  message  type  of
CertificateRetriavalMessage from some other node. If node has this certificate in its store
it sends it to the requesting node. Else this node sends the message to its neighbors.
CertificateRevocationMessage:  This  message  class  implements  Message  interface.
When  a  node  receives  a  message  in  type  of  CertificateAccusationMessage,  it  first
calculates behavior index of accusatory node and suspicion node. If it value exceeds a
revocation range then this nodes certificate should be revoked and should be put into
certificate revocation list. This type of message is sent to all over the network and gives
other nodes information about revoked node.
Confirmation:  This message class  implements  Message interface.  When a new node
wants to join to the network it starts joining protocol. If protocol is successfully applied at
the  end node  sends  Confirmation  message and it  sends its  certificate  to  all  over  the
network. This message also sends when a protocol successfully applied.
JoinInit1Message: This message class implements Message interface. When a new node
wants to join to the network, it first send authentication message. If the response to this
message is Authentication success message it send joint step 1 message. In this message
there is new nodes public key and message integrity provided by Message Authentication
Code (MAC).
Join1RespMessage:  This  message  class  implements  Message  interface.  When  new
arrival  node send JoinInitStep1 Message to its  neighbors,  all  the nodes receiving this
message sends a random data which is encrypted with new nodes public key. Message
integrity is provided by Message Authentication Code (MAC).
JoinInit2Message:  This  message  class  implements  Message  interface.  After  sending
joiningstep1 message new node to its neighbors, nodes received this message sends back
a random data encrypted with new nodes public key, and nodes sends this messages back
to new node as joinInitResponse message. After new node receives joinInitResponse it
takes the encrypted data and decrypts it with its private key and sends back clear text to
each node respectively. Message integrity is provided by Message Authentication Code
(MAC).
LeaveMessage: This message class implements Message interface. LeaveMessage is sent
when a node wants to leave the network. If a node wants to leave network it sends leave
message, the nodes in its range takes this message and sends this messages to the nodes in
their ranges. After receiving a leave message node updates its certificate store and updates
its routing table. If the threshold value is critic it must be adjusted so the share update
protocol dynamically starts.
ProactiveShareUpdateMessage:  This  message  class  implements  Message  interface.
ProactiveShareUpdateMessage is sent when the threshold value should be updated. This
protocol begins automatically when threshold value is critic. If the total node number is
high in respect of threshold value or it  is low, threshold value should be updated. An
algorithm works after each node join or node leave.
SecureCommunication:  This  message class implements  Message interface.  If a node
wants  to  communicate  with  a  node  securely  it  send  a  message  encrypted  with  the
destination nodes certificate and also it is signed with the source nodes private key. 
9.1.5.5 Package: tr.edu.itu.adhoc.network
In  this  section  we  give  all  classes  and  some  details  about  these  classes  in
tr.edu.itu.adhoc.network package.
Network:  This class  provides an interface to Ad hoc network class.  In this  class we
defined all methods and properties that an Ad hoc network object should have.
AdhocNetwork: This class implements Network interface. AdhocNetwork class is used
in bootstrapping phase. In simulation environment we generate all nodes, system private
key, public key and systems certificate. Also nodes key pairs are generated and according
to threshold algorithm system private key is  distributed to all  nodes.  In bootstrapping
phase nodes certificates are signed with systems private key and system public key is
loaded to all nodes. In simulation we also give random coordinates to all nodes.
Router:  This class is used to find path between nodes. A node executes this algorithm
when it needs to send a message to a node that it not its routing table. Also periodically it
is executed and routing table is updated according to nodes new locations.
Node: Sending message to other nodes and processing received messages are done in this
class.  Each  node  has  an  incoming  message  queue  and  an  outgoing  message  queue.
Messages that will be sent are put to outgoing message queue and received message are in
incoming  message  queue.  There  is  a  thread  that  watches  this  queues  and  process
messages. Also certificate and certificate revocation list operations are done in this class.
9.1.5.6 Package: tr.edu.itu.adhoc.simulation
In  this  section  we  give  all  classes  and  some  details  about  these  classes  in
tr.edu.itu.adhoc.simulation package.
SimulateNetwork: This class is used to simulate ad hoc network.
9.1.5.7 Package: tr.edu.itu.adhoc.store
In  this  section  we  give  all  classes  and  some  details  about  these  classes  in
tr.edu.itu.adhoc.store package.
Queue:  This class defines a data structure and some methods to manage nodes local
certificate store, routing table, certificate revocation list.
MyQueue: This class extends queue class. This class defines a data structure and some
methods to manage nodes local certificate store, routing table, certificate revocation list.
CertificateStore:  This  class  extends  MyQueue class. Each  node  in  Ad hoc  network
simulator has a certificate store.  If a node needs other node’s certificate  it  checks its
certificate store. If a new certificate is obtained it is stored in nodes certificate store. Also
there is certificate revocation list in this store. In our simulation environment node store is
limited and works as first in first out model. 
9.1.5.8 Package: tr.edu.itu.adhoc.utils
In  this  section  we  give  all  classes  and  some  details  about  these  classes  in
tr.edu.itu.adhoc.utils package.
Basic:  This class is a utility class that is used to increase readability of out simulation.
We define some constants in this class.
iniFiles: This class is a utility class that is used to process configuration file that is used
to configure the simulation environment.
Logger: This class is a utility class that is used for logging purpose. All the message of
the simulation program is saved in a file.
9.1.6 Snapshots from Simulation
The window shown in Figure 9.1 is open when the simulation is started. In this window
first  we  should  construct  the  network.  The  network  is  constructed  according  to  the
properties in config.ini file.
Figure 9.1 Ad hoc Network Simulator Main Frame
The window shown in Figure 9.2 is shown when a new ad hoc network is constructed. All
the system key pairs and nodes key pairs are generated. Also partial shares of nodes are
distributed to nodes.
Figure 9.2 Construction of Ad hoc Network (a-c)
This Figure 9.3 shows Node generation time according to threshold value.
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Figure 9.3 Node Generation Time
This menu is shown in Figure 9.4 is shown when user tries to find path from a source
node  to  a  destination  node.  This  path  is  found  according  to  Disjkstra  shortest  path
algorithm. 
Figure 9.4 Paths Finding from a Node to another Node (a-c)
The window shown in Figure 9.5 is shown when a mobile node moves from a coordinate
to another coordinate. Here destination and direction is parameter.
Figure 9.5 Moving a Node (a-c)
The figure in 9.6 shows all properties of a node. This nodes index is a parameter.
Figure 9.6 Properties of a Node (a-c)
The window shown in Figure 9.7 is shown when a new node tries to join in to the ad hoc
network.
.
Figure 9.7 Adding a new Node to the Ad hoc Network (a-i)
In Figure 9.8 it is shown that, two nodes wants to communicate securely. Source node
decides  destination node and if  its  certificate  is  not  in  its  local  store  it  finds  it.  The
message that will be encrypted is taken from source node and encrypted with destination
nodes public key and send. After receiving encrypted message, destination node decrypts
this message.
Figure 9.8 Secure Communication between nodes (a-g)
In figure 9.9 node accusation is shown.
Figure 9.9 A node accusation process (a-h) 
In figure 9.10 a node wants to leave the network. This process is shown in details.
Figure 9.10 A node leaving process from ad hoc network (a-h)
10. CONCLUSION
The protocols presented in this paper provide an efficient way to achieve authentication
for mobile nodes in Ad hoc network. 
In this paper, we studied security challenge details in mobile Ad hoc networks. Also, we
identified  the  requirements  for  security  solutions,  pointed  out  the  importance  of  its
security and propose a practical  Public Key Infrastructure service for Ad hoc networks.
Further, we have analyzed the security threats an Ad hoc network faces and presented the
security objectives that need to be achieved. We also presented a practical solution to
provide  Certificate  Authority  support  that  is  also  flexible  to  the  varying  network
configurations, simple to implement and easy to integrate with Ad hoc network routing
protocols.
To build a highly available and highly secure key management service, we propose to use
threshold cryptography to distribute trust among over all servers.  We also adopted the
fully  distributed  certificate  authority  approach,  which  means  the  capabilities  of  the
certificate authority are distributed to all nodes in the Ad hoc network. This work aims at
providing a scalable, distributed key management services in Ad hoc networks.
A prototype of the distributed key management service has been implemented,  which
shows its  feasibility and  availability.  Using this  practical  PKI service,  we present  an
effective  and  efficient  communication  protocol  for  correspondence  with  certification
services.
This proposed protocol offers a ubiquitous authentication service for mobile nodes. Also
confidentionaltiy, integrity and non-repudiation are guaranteed. 
The security protocol proposed is based on public key cryptography and certificate-based
approach.  Also  secret  sharing and threshold  cryptography algorithm is  used.  For  this
security protocol a simulation environment is developed. In this simulation environment
we implemented  all  steps  offered.  Bootstrapping  phase,  sharing  of  secret,  joining to
network, accusation of a node, providing mobility to a node and departure of a node steps
are implemented.
In  simulation  environment,  nodes  are  generated  in  a  predefined  area  of  random
coordinates. This coordinates may be user specified parameter. Also mobility of a node is
supplied by parameter and direction. This mobility can be provided by speed, time and
direction. Also, in this simulation environment, there is no time synchronization. Because
in  certificate  based  authentication  approach  time  is  very  important  it  should  be
implemented.  Also  proactive  share  update  protocol  should  be  optimized  because this
protocol takes long time. Also, threshold value may be optimized.
Consequently, our simulations we concluded that distributed key management system is a
applicable architecture for mobile Ad hoc networks. 
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